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The United States and many other nations are encountering a disturbing obstacle: A
shortage of available organs for patients who are in need of kidney transplantation. This
dissertation strives to analyze this trend and present potential solution by focusing on three
different aspects, namely regulatory oversight, information sharing, and post-transplant immunosuppressant drug choice. In my first essay, I propose a stochastic model that identifies
a socially-optimal kidney transplant choice given the inherent trade-off between the expected
wait time (driven by supply and demand) and the quality of received donor kidney. I modify
the model to account for changes made by the introduction of performance assessment in
2007 and the new kidney allocation system in 2014. Empirical analysis indicates that the
current risk-adjusted post-transplant performance assessment policy might be more effective
if regulators also adjust the model based on the differences in organ availability by regions
and candidate’s blood type.
Motivated by the high kidney discard rate in the US, in my second essay I develop a
simulation model that considers the effect of several important factors that affect kidney
utilization. Unlike most proposed models, the presented simulation reflects details of the
offering process, the deterioration of patient health and kidney quality over time, the correlation between patient’s health and acceptance decision, and the probability of kidney
acceptance. I apply the model to perform two different analyses. The former considers an
iv

individual-level strategy one may choose to contribute to the improvement of kidney discard
rate, opting for simultaneously enlisting in multiple regions. The latter focuses on a macrolevel aspect of transplantation, namely the contribution of information sharing on the social
welfare and discard rates.
Long-term successful post-transplant outcome necessitates the use of immunosuppressant drug therapy to prevent immunologic rejection and maintain transplanted kidney function. Since kidney transplantation is primarily financed through public funds in the U.S.
(Medicare), in my third essay I define, from the payer’s perspective, the incremental costeffectiveness among four different treatment regimens, i.e., no-induction, IL2-RA, r-ATG,
and alemtuzumab. The analysis indicates that antibody-based induction appears to offer
substantial advantages regarding both cost and outcome compared to no-induction. Overall,
depletional induction (preferably r-ATG) provides the highest benefit.
Organ transplantation is a complicated process which is continuously changing. This
thesis cannot cover all aspects but provides valuable insights into several important issues.
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To my family

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Motivation
The United States and many other nations are encountering a disturbing obstacle: A
shortage of available organs for patients who are in need of kidney transplantation. In the
US, currently more than 100,000 patients are waiting to receive kidney transplantation. In
2015, a total of 17,879 kidney transplantations were performed. Over 3,000 new patients
are added to the kidney waiting list each month, and the average wait time for a suitable
organ has increased to almost five years. On average, more than 4,000 patients die each year
while waiting for a life-saving kidney transplant, and more than 3,000 patients become too
sick to undergo transplantation surgery and thus are removed from the waitlist [50, 87, 92].
Despite an acute shortage of kidney donations, each year more than two thousand kidneys
recovered from deceased donors are discarded without being transplanted. Dr. Dorry Segev,
a transplant surgeon at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, said, “There is no
doubt that organs that can help somebody and have a survival benefit are being discarded
every day [68].” This has led to several recent changes made by several organizations involved
in kidney transplantation.
In March 2007, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) issued Conditions of Participation (CoP) for kidney transplant centers. As a result, transplant centers
must meet CMS expectations of risk adjusted post-transplant outcomes, especially one-year
patient and kidney survival, to receive Medicare funding and public support. In particular,
transplant centers that fail to meet CMS evaluation metrics are subject to quality review and
most likely will require to enter a Systems Improvement Agreement (SIA). Transplant centers that lose CMS support will likely run out of business since private insurance companies
1

typically will not renew their contracts with such centers as well.
On the other hand, the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network (OPTN) applies
a different set of evaluation metrics to assess transplant centers’ outcomes. Failure to satisfy OPTN performance metrics will result in transplant centers losing their status of “a
member in good-standing,” which is a requirement to receive organs for transplantation.
Risk-adjusted post-transplant outcomes of each transplant center are available to the general public through the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipient (SRTR) website under
the name of Program-Specific Reports (PSR).
The fact that CMS and OPTN have established their quality assurance policies in such
a way that penalizes transplant centers for unexpected post-transplant outcomes was the
main motivation for my research to study and analyze behavioral response of transplant
centers to quality oversight. Since both CMS and OPTN do not take any action about the
mortality rate of waitlisted patients, transplant centers might not worry about their pretransplant outcomes as much as they are concerned with their post-transplant outcomes. A
New York Times article [68] mentioned, “In interviews, dozens of transplant specialists said
the threat of government penalties had made doctors far more selective about the organs
and patients they accepted, leading to more discards.” This reflects a strategy that can save
transplant centers from being identified as underperforming by only accepting higher quality
donor kidneys as well as enlisting only relatively healthy patients. Dr. Michael Rees, a
transplant surgeon at the University of Toledo Medical Center, stated in a New York Times
article that his kidney program was cited by CMS in 2008 after several unlikely failures.
To save the program from decertification, he cut back to about 60 transplants a year from
100, becoming far more selective about the organs and recipients he accepted. The one-year
transplant survival rate rose from 88 percent to 96 percent, but Dr. Rees still is bothered by
the trade-off [68]: “Which serves America better?” he asked. “A program doing 100 kidneys
and 88 of them are working, or a program that does 60 kidneys and 59 of them are working?
It’s rationing health care under the guise of quality, and it’s a tragedy that we are throwing
away perfectly good organs.”

2

1.2. Research question and methods
In this dissertation, I investigate these trends and address the research question of how
strategies like regulatory oversight, information sharing, and post-transplant immunosuppressant drug choice can improve medical outcomes and social welfare. I will use methods
including stochastic modeling, simulation, optimization, and data analytics.

1.3. Structure of the dissertation
The focus of Chapter 2 is on the impact of performance measurement on kidney transplantation. It aims to assist the regulators in designing an optimal incentive structure using
a performance assessment policy. The main questions I want to answer are how severe the
action of the regulator should be when dealing with underperforming centers and how much
evidence is needed to impose such an action. To address these questions, I first develop
a stochastic model that considers the impact of the candidates health, organ quality, and
expected wait time (affected by supply and demand) on a candidate’s and a center’s utilities.
I define a simple threshold strategy on the acceptable range of kidney qualities and find the
optimal thresholds for both candidates and centers. I also define the social optimal outcome
using an overall utilitarian welfare function from the social planner’s perspective.
I show that rational centers have an incentive to make transplantation decisions that do
not lead to an optimal social outcome and thus there is a need for performance assessment and
penalties. Based on the proposed model, I derive the optimal incentive structure to minimize
social loss. I show that penalties have to be adjusted not only for the risk due to a candidate’s
health but also for supply and demand since they affect the candidate’s wait time and optimal
kidney quality threshold. The direct effect of supply on the optimal incentive structure
makes it necessary to investigate the way kidney are allocated to candidates. Recently,
changes made to the Kidney Allocation System (KAS) resulted in shifting the kidney supply
in favor of specific groups of healthier candidates. I show that changing the allocation system
without adjusting the performance assessment leads to sub-optimal results, and I derive how
the incentive structure needs to be modified.
3

An empirical analysis using the model suggests that the elements that affect a candidate’s
wait time, including candidates blood type and region supply, need to be taken into consideration in making the best kidney transplant choice. By analyzing the transplant data from
the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipient (SRTR) I found that outcome assessment
has been effective for transplant centers to achieve a transplant decision close to the social
optimum for 42% of recipients. I also found that the current risk-adjusted post-transplant
performance assessment policy might be more effective if regulators also adjust the model
based on the organ availability in each of the 11 geographical transplantation regions and
the candidate’s blood types.
In Chapter 3, I develop a flexible simulation model to analyze the effect of changes to
the kidney allocation system and the offering process. The primary challenge of modeling
the organ acceptance/rejection problem is incorporating real-world conditions and situations
associated with making a crucial life-saving decision. For this reason, my primary intention
as the main novelty of this work is to recognize, aggregate, and implement most essential elements that contribute to kidney selection criteria. The simulation model takes into account
the candidate’s health and health deterioration, the deterioration of donor kidney quality
during the allocation process, and supply and demand. Furthermore, the model considers
the chance that a matching kidney cannot be accepted because of other reasons (e.g., shortterm sickness of the patient, insufficient surgical resources, etc.), as well as the impact of
information sharing on the efficiency of the offering process.
Using parameters estimated from data provided by UNOS and SRTR, I apply the simulation model to investigate two important trends in kidney transplantation: (1) multiple
listing, which allows the patient to be enlisted simultaneously in several regions, and (2) information technology, to speed up the process of organ allocation. For the first application, I
formulate the listing decision as a utility maximization problem under a set budget constrain
with additional constraints on distance and facility specific parameters. The proposed model
allows for diversity in candidate health and kidney quality as well as the correlation between
a candidate’s health and the demanded kidney quality. Moreover, I include the quality
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deterioration of kidneys caused by accumulating Cold Ischemia Time (CIT) as the offering
process progresses down the waiting list to find a recipient. In addition to all aforementioned
elements, I also model the impact of the candidate’s short term health and availability together with human and facility resources restriction. The model informs candidates about
a multiple-enlisting policy by offering a set of regions to enlist in given distance, cost and
transplant volume constraints.
The second application of the simulation model proposed in Chapter 2 draws attention
to the social welfare aspect of kidney transplantation rather than focusing on finding an
optimal solution as considered in the first model. I compare the social welfare results (i.e.,
donor kidney utilization and post transplant utility) in the presence and absence of perfect
information submitted by the decision makers to the organ allocator. Such information
includes the candidate’s willingness and transplant hospital’s readiness for performing a
transplantation surgery. The simulation quantifies how collecting and sharing such precise
data in a timely manner can be helpful to allocate retrieved organs more efficiently.
Chapter 4 deals with an important aspect that affects post-transplant outcomes. After
a candidate receives a kidney transplant, his/her body recognizes the new organ as foreign
and will attack the new kidney and try to destroy it. It is recommended that the patient
takes immunosuppressive drugs which prevents the body from damaging the transplanted
organ. The anti-rejection medicines which lower the body’s ability to reject a transplanted
organ are expensive and under some certain specific conditions can be covered by Medicare
up to three years following the transplant. However, the majority of patients need to take
them for the rest of their life. Effective immunosuppressive drugs have a major impact on
post-transplant outcomes. To cover this aspect, I use data analytics to conducted a costeffectiveness analysis from the payer’s perspective to find the most cost-effective treatment
option among four different induction groups. I link the United States Renal Data System
dataset to Medicare claims to estimate cumulative costs, graft survival, and incremental costeffectiveness ratio (ICER) within three years of transplantation in 19,450 (Deceased Donor
Kidney Transplantation) DDKT recipients with Medicare as primary payer from 2000 to
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2008. I divide the study cohort into high-risk (age > 60 years, panel reactive antibody
> 20%, African American race, Kidney Donor Profile Index > 50%, cold ischemia time
> 24 hours) and low-risk (not having any risk factors, comprising approximately 15% of the
cohort). Following the elimination of dominated options, I estimate expected ICER among
induction categories: no-induction, alemtuzumab, rabbit anti-thymocyte globulin (r-ATG),
and interleukin-2 receptor-antagonist. The analysis confirms that induction therapy always
offers substantial benefits in both cost and survival compared to no-induction. Overall,
r-ATG induction provides the most significant benefits.

1.4. Contributions
The presented optimization and simulation models in conjunction with the empirical data
analyses using the clinical dataset introduce several contributions to the current literature.
In my work I aggregate the complex multi-stage processes of kidney transplant decision together from the perspective of different decision makers (patient, transplant center and social
planner) by considering realistic factors that can affect their decisions. Detailed contributions
include:
1. Model transplant decisions include enlisting the patients to the waitlist and accepting
donor kidney offer.
2. Examine the impact of regulatory oversight and different kidney allocation systems on
above decisions.
3. Model patient’s multiple kidney transplant waitlisting decision to maximize patient
post-transplant expected utility given budget, distance and performance constraints.
4. Investigate the role of technology and value of information sharing in kidney transplant
area and its outcomes such as post transplant expected utility, kidney utilization and
waitlist mortality rates.
5. Identify a cost-effective immunosuppression medication choice for kidney transplant
recipient under different willingness-to-pay threshold.
6

Chapter 2
MODELING KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION DECISIONS AND REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT

Healthcare quality assessment was designed more than a decade ago to establish a basic
level of quality through evaluating and reporting the performance outcomes of healthcare
providers. Depending on the focus area of performance assessment which can be healthcare service delivery, patients outcomes, or both, the reported results of the performance
evaluation may differ significantly. Furthermore, the legitimacy and fairness of performance
outcomes are determined by the accuracy of data collection, the use of appropriate riskadjustment of assessment metrics, and the organization that discloses the outcomes.
Private organizations and government regulators can use performance reports to assess
the outcomes of healthcare providers, recognize underperforming care providers, and take
appropriate actions to assure that patients will receive a high level of care. Patients and
insurance companies can use the performance report to select providers who have appropriate or even outstanding outcomes. Outcome-based provider selection is an important
mechanism which might lead to quality improvement since a rational response of providers
is to increase their performance to stay competitive. Also, providers may be concerned with
their reputation among peers as well as the patient population. Therefore, performance assessment outcomes are seen as a tool to motivate the healthcare providers to provide a high
level of care.
In spite of constructive effects of performance reporting in the healthcare organization,
there are some concerns expressed about public performance reporting. At the same time
that performance outcomes can change the organizational behavior in beneficial ways, they
can also alter it in problematic ways. The relevant concerns can be divided into three major
groups.
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The first group questions the validity of performance assessment itself, and whether or
not it is appropriate to apply it to the healthcare system. This is based on the belief that
the field of quality assessment in healthcare is still imperfect and metrics that have been approved for one purpose may not be applicable for other purposes. The performance metric
derived from an administrative dataset may not be valid for supervising and comparing the
performance outcomes across different healthcare organizations such as hospitals. Furthermore, comparing outcomes across institutions are constrained by the difficulties of carrying
out appropriate statistical analysis that incorporates appropriate adjustments for differences
in risk (e.g., differences in patient populations). Another concern brought up to the attention
by the first group is that instead of focusing on the outcome measurement, the emphasis
should be on process measurement. They believe that the performance of healthcare organizations should be evaluated based on what is performed to improve the quality rather than
measuring patients outcomes such as mortality and morbidity rates [17, 20, 22, 93, 97].
The second group is concerned about the potential unintended consequences of performance assessment and whether the assessment metrics used for evaluation are accurate and
appropriate [17, 20, 22, 93, 97]. Their concern is the potential dilemma arises with outcomebased performance assessment in a market with substantial excess demand. In such a case,
underperforming organization may not improve their performance with assessment if gaming
the system is less costly than actually improving the performance. Furthermore, an organization may enhance its measured performance through restricting access to the care for
patients that are believed to carry risk to negatively impact the used outcome metrics. For
these reasons, the design of regulations and the assessment factors are the essential elements
that should be considered in designing successful performance assessment metrics.
The concern of the third group is regarding the interpretation of performance measurement and its application by different sectors and patients. Misinterpreting the performance
outcomes by payers and regulators may develop the risk of shutting down the healthcare
facility or the provider. On the other hand, misinterpretation of performance outcomes
by patients may provide a significant risk in seeking the appropriate care given the limited
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number of clinical areas for which the outcome assessment have originally been implemented.
The reason stated is that strong performance in one area does not predict such performance
in other clinical areas.
In this chapter we focus on the impact of performance measurement on kidney transplantation. Kidney transplantation is especially interesting since kidney transplant centers
have more flexibility to game the system than other organ transplant centers. Candidates
waitlisted for kidney transplantation can live on dialysis, and thus the center can delay transplanting riskier patients to improve their performance measures. To receive federal funding
from the Medicare, transplant centers must perform at least three kidney transplants per
year. Since most kidney transplant centers can easily meet this criterion, they can improve
their outcomes by cherry picking donor kidneys and refusing those kidneys that are believed
to pose a threat to their performance evaluation, even if the transplantation might be beneficial to the candidate. Furthermore, regulators have established a policy that penalizes
transplant centers for their unexpected post-transplant outcomes by subjecting them to a
review process. However, regulators do not take any action about the mortality rate of
waitlisted patients. For this reason, transplant centers might not worry about their pretransplant outcomes as much as they are concerned with their post-transplant outcomes. A
New York Times article [68] mentioned, “In interviews, dozens of transplant specialists said
the threat of government penalties had made doctors far more selective about the organs
and patients they accepted, leading to more discards.” This clearly shows that worries about
unindented consequences of performance evaluation need to be considered.
The goal of this chapter is to assist the regulators in designing an optimal incentive
structure based on performance assessment policy. Actions by the regulator can include
subjecting underperforming centers to a quality review and improvement process, excluding centers from having access to transplant organs, as well as direct financial incentives
in the form of reduction of reimbursement rates, fines, or paying bonuses for exceptional
performance. The main questions are how severe these actions should be (e.g, scope of the
performance review or amount of the fine) and how much evidence is needed to impose the
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action (e.g., the chance that an adverse event triggers an action).
To address these questions, we first develop a stochastic model that considers the impact
of the candidates health, organ quality, and the expected wait time (affected by supply and
demand) on candidate’s and center’s utility. We define a simple threshold strategy on the
acceptable kidney quality and find the optimal thresholds for both candidates and centers.
We also define the social optimal outcome using an overall utilitarian welfare function from
the social planner’s perspective. We show that rational centers have an incentive to make
transplantation decisions that do not lead to an optimal social outcome and thus there would
be a need for performance assessment and penalties.
Based on the stochastic model, we derive the optimal incentive structure to minimize
the social loss. We show that penalties have to be adjusted not only for the risk due to
candidate’s health but also for supply and demand since they affect candidate’s wait time
and optimal kidney quality threshold. The direct effect of supply on the optimal incentive
structure makes it necessary to investigate the kidney allocation system (KAS). Recently,
changes made to the kidney allocation system resulted in shifting the kidney supply in favor
of specific groups of healthier candidates. We show that leaving the old incentive structure
in place leads to sub-optimal results and how the incentive structure needs to be adjusted.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 discusses the background on
kidney transplantation and performance assessment. In Section 2.2 we perform medical and
analytical literature reviews. The proposed model is described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
derives the optimal organ acceptance decisions for both candidates and providers. In Section
2.5 we discuss the optimal regulatory oversight and the factors that affect it. Section 2.6
derives the optimal policy for the provider to accept a candidate to their waitlist. Section 2.7
analyzes the new allocation system and its impact on optimal transplant decision. The empirical analysis is performed in Chapter 2.8. Finally in Section 2.9 we talk about concluding
remarks and future work.
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2.1. Background on kidney transplantation
The United States and many other nations are encountering a shortage of available
organs for patients who are in need of kidney transplantation. In the US, currently more
than 100,000 patients are waiting to receive kidney transplantation. In 2015, a total of 17,879
kidney transplantations were performed. Over 3,000 new patients are added to the kidney
waiting list each month and on average, more than 4,000 patients die each year while waiting
for a life-saving kidney transplant and more than 3,000 patients become too sick to receive
a kidney transplant and thus are removed from the waitlist [50, 87, 92].
Despite an acute shortage of kidney donations, each year more than two thousand kidneys
recovered from deceased donors were discarded without being transplanted [43]. Dr. Dorry
Segev, a transplant surgeon at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, said, “There is
no doubt that organs that can help somebody and have a survival benefit are being discarded
every day [68].” In another article, Dr. Michael Rees, a transplant surgeon at the University
of Toledo Medical Center, stated in a New York Times article that his kidney program was
cited by CMS in 2008 after several unlikely failures. To save the program from decertification,
he cut back to about 60 transplants a year from 100, becoming far more selective about the
organs and recipients he accepted. The one-year transplant survival rate rose to 96 percent
from 88 percent, but Dr. Rees still is bothered by the trade-off [68]: “Which serves America
better?” he asked.“A program doing 100 kidneys and 88 percent of them are working, or a
program that does 60 kidneys and 59 of them are working? It’s rationing health care under
the guise of quality, and it’s a tragedy that we are throwing away perfectly good organs.”
When making decisions about organ transplantations, several parties are involved. The
main parties are depicted in Figure 2.1. Patients are concerned with the optimal health
outcome for them. Transplantation centers care about the health of their patients, the center’s economic situation, and reputation. Finally, a social planner is interested in optimizing
the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall system. The two most important regulatory
agencies for transplant centers are the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS)
and the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Currently, CMS is the largest payer
11

Figure 2.1.

Parties involved in kidney transplantation decisions and their relationships.

for transplantations and transplantation related expenses in the United States, and UNOS
holds the organ procurement and transplant network contract. These two agencies apply two
different evaluation metrics to assess transplant center outcomes. The Scientific Registry of
Transplant Recipients (SRTR) collects and analyses transplant center data to produce several
program-specific reports. After finalizing the assessment, SRTR publishes the risk-adjusted
outcome for every transplant program, and the results are available to the general public. To
assess the performance of transplantation programs, CMS currently employs a risk-adjusted
frequentist statistical method. This method calculates an expected event count and compares it to the number of observed events. The hypothesis of “the program’s performance
is as expected” can be ruled out only if the observed event count is unusually high or low
when compared to the expected count. For more details on this method, readers are referred to [2]. On the other hand, OPTN currently uses Bayesian inference [69], a statistical
approach which helps the observer to update a prior belief about the transplant program’s
performance after observing a set of new data.
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Naturally, in an environment with multiple parties, issues with misaligned incentives may
occur. For kidney allocations, the social planer has recently implemented some new policies
to improve system efficiency and outcomes. One change is the implementation of healthcare
quality report cards. Such report cards are designed to promote the quality of medical care
offered by the healthcare system. Report cards can assist healthcare providers to recognize
possible quality deficiencies and take steps to address present shortcomings and ameliorate
their effects. Different report cards consider different factors for measuring quality including
patient health outcomes, patient experience and the process of delivering care. Regulators
implement citation policies, where transplant programs that fail to satisfy regulatory agencies
performance metric will be cited and are subject to review. In March 2007, the Centers
for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) issued Conditions of Participation (CoP) for
kidney transplant centers. As a result, transplant centers must meet CMS expectations
of risk adjusted post-transplant outcomes, especially one-year patient and kidney survival,
to receive Medicare funding and public support. In particular, transplant centers that fail
to meet CMS evaluation metrics are subject to quality review and most likely will require
entering a Systems Improvement Agreement (SIA). Transplant centers that lose CMS support
will likely run out of business since private insurance companies typically will not renew
their contracts with such centers as well. On the other hand, the Organ Procurement and
Transplant Network (OPTN) applies different evaluation metrics to assess transplant centers’
outcomes. Failure to satisfy OPTN performance metrics will cause transplant centers to
lose their status of “a member in good-standing,” which is a requirement to participate in
organ transplantation. Risk-adjusted post-transplant outcomes of each transplant center
are available to the general public through the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipient
(SRTR) website under the name of Program-Specific Reports (PSR).
Quality assurance programs and the regulatory oversight provide incentives for quality monitoring to protect patients from harm. In fact, performance oversight has led to
numerous quality reviews of transplant centers that identified deficiencies and led to improvement efforts [30, 31, 75]. However, even though report cards offer substantial potential
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benefits, public reporting and quality oversight may cause unintended consequences, such as
motivating providers to restrict access to care for patients that may bring a risk to negatively affect the used performance metrics [38]. This type of patient selection has been also
been illustrated in other healthcare contexts associated with the implementation of report
cards [35, 97].
Another aspect of concern for report cards is that due to public reporting of performance,
transplant centers may unintentionally become more selective of donor organs, which may
result in a higher rate of organ discard and longer cold ischemia times, the time between the
kidney is procured and it is transplanted to the recipient. A prolonged cold ischemia time
reduces the quality of the organ and thus the potential benefit to the recipient. Additionally,
the centers may not be enthusiastic to share their outcomes with patients, so they may
apply adjustments that prevent full capture of risk levels regarding a given transplant [4,75].
Finally, according to some studies [37], even though report cards are designed to provide
quality information to potential patients, their direct effect on patients selecting transplant
centers has been shown to be minimal.
Designing a report card that reliably assesses clinical quality is challenging. The ideal
evaluation of an outcome-oriented report card is based on reliable evidence such as available
clinical data and appropriate statistical techniques. To have a credible outcome evaluation
produced by statistical methods, the need for sufficient and accurate data is necessary. However, there are many areas in healthcare where it is evident that data collection is difficult.
It is very challenging and complicated to assess the accuracy of report cards due to the
ambiguity of what the gold standard should be when the measurement technique has potential shortcomings. The use of different evaluation methodologies and data sources produces
different results, so the creditability of report cards necessitates constant investigation and
improvements.
Wait time to transplant and quality of the received kidney are key factors. Across the
US, the wait time for a kidney transplant currently ranges from a few months to up to 10
years. The US is divided into 11 geographic regions, each served by an organ procurement
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organization (OPO) to facilitate organ allocation and transplantation. Multiple factors influence the wait time for the kidney transplant, but the two critical ones are candidate’s
kidney supply and the kidney acceptance strategy. A candidate’s kidney supply is mainly
determined by candidate’s blood type and the region of candidate’s transplant center. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 and show the expected wait time and quality of transplanted kidneys across
4 different blood types and 11 regions using SRTR dataset. As it is shown, the wait time till
first-time deceased kidney transplant varies significantly from one region and for different
blood types. In the ideal situation, the decision maker should consider candidate’s kidney
supply in making transplant decision. However, the data reveals that, the average quality of
accepted kidneys is almost the same among candidates of four different blood types.
Kidney allocation affects supply. In 2013, the OPTN approved a new donor Kidney Allocation System (KAS) which came into effect in late 2014. The new KAS is designed based
on two new features: (1) a Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI) which is a numerical measure
that incorporates ten donor factors into a single number representing the quality of deceased
donor kidney compared to other procured kidneys; (2) an Estimated Post Transplant Survival (EPTS) score for transplantation candidates, an indicator of expected life span after
transplant. Both KDPI and EPTS scores range from 0% (the best) to 100% (the worst).
The primary goal of KAS is to increase the efficiency by allocating top 20 percent of kidneys
(KDPI≤ 20%) to the top 20 percent of candidates (EPTS≤ 20%). This follows the idea
that allocating the best kidneys to the best candidates results in higher overall utility for
the system.

2.2. Literature review
This section reviews research on regulatory oversight discussed in the medical and the
analytical literatures. Modeling kidney transplantation processes and the effect of regularity
oversight is an important topic discussed in the medical and the analytical literatures. Here
we give a very short overview of current literature.
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Figure 2.2. Expected wait time and quality of transplanted kidney across four different
blood types.

2.2.1. Medical literature
Pelletier et al. [61] focus on the PSRs managed by OPTN and CMS. For instance, PSRs
intentionally aim to identify low-performing centers with the goal that their performance is
eventually improved, which in turn results in improving post-transplant patient and graft
survival. However, there is no significant correlation between public availability of report
cards and how patients select their transplantation center. Moreover, current PSR’s try
to achieve high sensitivity to not miss low-performing centers. This has resulted in a high
false-positive rate with significant impact on the centers mistakenly cited.
Many authors analyze unintended consequences of report cards including increased wait
times, increased discard rates, and decreased transplantation volume. Schold et al. [75] have
found a significant association between low-performing centers and reduced kidney transplant
volume in the presence of CMS’s Conditions of Participation (COPs). Their analysis reveals
an average decline of 22.4 cases among low-performing centers in contrast to an increase of
7.8 cases among other centers in regard to the transplant volume.
White et al. [100] have considered the effect of COPs by CMS on the volume and donor,
recipient and candidate selection of kidney transplant programs. Although the trends in 116

Figure 2.3.

Expected wait time and quality of transplanted kidney across 11 regions.

year kidney graft loss do not show a systematic reduction or shift in the number of marginal
candidates and in the utilization of higher-risk donor kidneys, the total volume and donor
organ utilization decreased overall among programs with ongoing noncompliance.
Schnier et al. [71] have studied the impact of CMS’s regulatory oversight on waiting
time for transplantation finding a longer time on the waitlist for candidates registered in
low-performing centers compared to those listed in other centers.
Schnier et al. [74] study the impact of performance oversight on candidate removals
from the kidney transplant waitlist. Their analysis shows that low-performance centers
have higher (risk adjusted) rates of waitlist removal compared to other centers. They show
that although the performance oversight on low-performance centers improves their posttransplant outcomes, it also significantly decreases transplant rate while increasing waitlist
removal.
Woodside et al. [104] point to the current performance evaluation program of organ transplantation by CMS, how the process is performed and factors that are present or missing in
risk adjustment of outcomes. Although COPs by CMS have improved transplant survival
outcomes, statistics show that this outcome is achieved at the cost of tremendous increase
in risk-averse behavior by transplant centers, resource utilization, and innovation discour17

agement. OPTN and CMS has started to address these concerns in their recent regulatory
changes.
Risk adjustment is another important topic. Schold et al. [72] compare frequentist (i.e.,
fixed-effects) methods with Bayesian inference for center performance evaluation. While
the former methods assess outcomes using traditional statistical tests on count data, the
latter ones update prior beliefs with new evidence in the form of observations. Due to
lack of sufficient data for small centers, the frequentist approach may favor large centers as
statistically more significant and base the results for smaller centers on a very small number
of observations. In contrast, the use of prior beliefs in the Bayesian approach pushes small
centers toward the prior beliefs. Several challenges exist with Bayesian approach such as
choosing a valid prior belief distribution, the appearance of a shift in large centers versus
small centers, and being prone to misinterpreting their outcomes by patients, centers and
payers.
Discard rates of donor organs are a significant issue. Reese et al. [64] take the high discard rate of donor kidneys into account. Despite the long time (> 5 years) many candidates
of kidney transplant have to spend on the national waitlist and the high waitlist morality,
a considerable portion of kidneys recovered from deceased donors (> 17% in 2013) are discarded. This study examines the risks of accepting donor kidneys, including discarded ones,
versus remaining on dialysis and offers some proposals to reduce the discard rate, such as rewarding with higher reimbursement and offering additional priority on next available kidneys
when a high-KDPI kidney is transplanted by a center, encouraging centers to transplant two
lower-quality kidneys into one recipient, excluding patients with highest-KDPI transplanted
kidneys from report card evaluation, adopting a metric for a center’s organ acceptance rate
that is not paired with a center’s transplant rate, fast tracking of high-KDPI kidneys to
centers with a good history of accepting such kidneys, and changing the informed consent
process to facilitate offering of high-KDPI kidneys.
Snyder et al. [79] challenge the belief that accepting high-risk kidneys (KDPI ≥ 0.85)
worsen center’s PSRs. Their study shows that eliminating such high-risk kidneys from the
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evaluation would not safe underperforming centers from being cited as underperforming.
Also, their hypothetical examination indicates that transplanting additional kidneys with
KDPIs similar to those of currently discarded kidneys would also not increase the risk for
low-performance evaluations.

2.2.2. Analytical literature
Analytical literature mainly focuses on the response to the information revealed by report
cards as well as optimal choices made by patients, providers and regulators.
Miller [47] has investigated the theoretical justification to model the provider’s response
to quality reporting. The analysis is based on the assumption that the more information
is given to patients, the more incentive they have to look for higher quality providers. The
effect of report card is modeled by a noise random variable which illustrates the difference
between consumer’s perception of provider’s quality and the actual quality of the provider.
More available information by report cards is equate to a decrease in noise, or equivalently,
an increase in the accuracy of information about a provider’s quality. The level of noise
depends on the provider’s quality of care and thus, providers respond differently to quality
oversight.
Dranove et al. [19] model transplantation as driven by market forces and propose a
structural model to evaluate the efficacy of new information provided by report cards. The
study finds that the report cards considerably raise the market share of hospitals only when
the scores differ from prior beliefs. However, this effect is not symmetric, meaning that
report cards cause a significant decrease in demand when the quality score is lower than the
prior belief but do not bring much benefit when better-than-expected scores are related to
high-ranking hospitals.
Modeling and improving the system design is another important stream of research. Su
et al. [81] study the effect of patient choice on the high rate of organ discard. They employ
a queuing model in which patients are served with a variable reward reflecting the quality of
transplant organs. Moreover, patients are homogeneous, have complete information about
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the size of the waitlist, and can reject an organ offer with the hope of receiving a better
offer in the future. A dynamic programing approach is used to maximum the social welfare
under first-come-first-serve (FCFS) and last-come-first-serve (LCFS) strategies. While FCFS
intensifies the refusal rates of organs having marginal quality, LCFS results in optimal organ
utilization. Their analysis shows that organ supply can be 25% improved by restructuring
the queuing mechanism.
Ahn et al. [7] design a decision model in which patients’ preferences for kidney transplantation are involved in the allocation process, as opposed to the current allocation system
which provides the patients little opportunity to choose their desired donor kidneys. The
expected 1-year graft survival rate is used as the criterion to judge the acceptability of a
donor kidney, which is estimated based on a model. Different health states are defined for
patients and health development is modeled using a Markov chain. The results are compared
with the UNOS system.
Fong et al. [23] investigates an optimal regulation in the form of a scoring rule to evaluate
service providers who can take unobservable (private) actions to improve their outcomes at
the expense of others. Her analysis is based on continuous-time techniques which consider
a dynamic mixed model with instantaneous payment in examining the dynamic setting of
healthcare provision.
To investigate the issue from the perspective of the transplantation center, Howard et
al. [36] uses a dynamic programming model to investigate why surgeons turn down organs
despite their shortage. His analysis shows consistency of surgeons behavior with an optimal
stopping rule in which they turn down low-quality organs for healthy patients in the hope
to see better organ offers in the future. With the growth of the waiting list, surgeons have
now more incentives to use low-quality organs.
Zhang et al. [107] looks at the problem from the patient perspective. He investigates
observational learning and information sharing among patients on the kidney waiting list. It
means that patients get negatively biased by earlier refusals and accordingly refuse offered
kidneys more easily. This negative effect is distributed sequentially on the waitlist and leads
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to poor kidney utilization despite the prevailing shortage in kidney supply. A dynamic
choice model is developed where patients make an optimal compromise between accepting
the current kidney and waiting for future kidneys.
Finally, Levy et al. [44] takes into account the three main parties involved in a transplantation including the recipient, the donor, and the surgeon (or hospital). The well-being of the
living donor and the recipient is modeled by the quality-adjusted life-years and the surgeon
is assumed to be concerned by the well-being of the donor and recipient, and interested in
acquisition of experience and knowledge from performing the transplant.

2.3. Model description and problem formulation
The last stage of chronic kidney disease is kidney failure, also called end-stage renal
disease (ESRD). ESRD patients require frequent dialysis treatments to stay alive until they
receive a donor kidney. To start this process, ESRD patients need to become transplantation
candidates by being accepted by a transplant center and put on a centrally managed waitlist.
Once a candidate advances to the front of the waitlist, he or she starts to receive offers of
kidneys of varying quality and every time needs to make with his or her health care provider
an acceptance decision. In case a kidney is accepted, the transplantation is performed and
the candidate leaves the waitlist. Figure 2.4 shows the transplantation process.
We discuss the kidney acceptance decision of a candidate on the waitlist in the following
several sections. The initial decision to accept a candidate to the center will be discussed
later (in Section 2.7.2) since it is based on expected outcomes that depend on the kidney
acceptance decision.
Modeling kidney acceptance decisions has to incorporate many very complicated relationships. In the following we will first introduce the general form of the model. The model
can be used to derive optimal kidney acceptance decisions. Using some simplifying assumptions (e.g, assuming linear relationships, constant risk for survival, etc.), we obtain a closed
form solution. Even with these simplifications, the resulting closed form solutions are still
useful since they allow us to reason about the basic mechanics of the system and show that
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Figure 2.4. Major stages of the transplantation process.

the model is able to capture many important aspects observed in the real world. It is easy
to replace the simplifications with more realistic functional forms or empirically obtained
relationships and then resort to numerical methods or simulation to find optimal decisions.

2.3.1. Modeling framework of kidney acceptance decision
We model the waiting list as a set of queues. Each queue (see Figure 2.5) serves kidneys
that match a certain type of candidates based on medical kidney matching criteria (e.g.,
blood type), and candidates can only join the queue they match. In the following, we will
concentrate on only modeling a single queue, since the functioning of each of these queues is
identical. Instead of serving candidates using the standard FIFO method, we adopt a more
complicated process reflecting the fact that candidates can decide if they want to accept an
offered kidney.
Assumption 1 We assume that only the top N candidates in front of the waiting list actively
receive offers, and we call them the candidates in the active set. Since we do not model all
details about the kidney assignment process, we simplify the process so that every time a
kidney arrives to the queue, one of the top N candidates in the active set is randomly chosen
and offered the kidney. The candidate receiving the offer can then decide to accept the kidney,
get served and leave the queue or reject the offer, deny the service and stay in place.
We use this method to reflect that the first candidate will not always be able to consider
the offer. For example, the candidate may be currently traveling, too sick to perform the
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transplantation, or for some other reasons not available.
Assumption 2 Patients arrive with rate λ. We do not make any assumptions about the
arrival process, only that the arrival rate is greater than the transplantation rate, µa .
Although, the the arrival rate is greater than the transplantation rate, the queue will only
grow to finite length since candidates also leave the queue with the rate of θ without service
due to death on the waitlist or other delisting for other reasons. We measure candidate
health as the expected remaining life time on dialysis. We will use h > 0 to denote the
expected remaining life time on dialysis of a candidate when he or she joins the active set.
Assumption 3 We model the arrival process of donor kidneys (matching the respective
queue) as a Poisson process with arrival rate µ. Each kidney arrives with a quality q in the
range [0, 1] modeled as the realization of a sequence of i.i.d. random variables Q. Since the
active set is of size N and we assign the kidney randomly to a candidate, an individual’s
offer rate in this setting is µo =

µ
.
N

We model the post-transplant candidate utility, U c for a candidate with health h who
receives a kidney of quality q as

U c (h, q, wt ) = B(h, q) [1 − C (h, wt )] ,

(2.1)

where B(·) is the benefit the candidate receives from the transplant which increases with
candidate health h and the kidney quality, i.e.,

∂B(h)
∂h

> 0 and

∂B(q)
∂q

> 0. C(·) ∈ [0, 1]

represents the candidate’s health deterioration factor after a wait time of wt starting when
he or she joins the active set. The health deterioration strictly increases with the wait time
and C(·) becomes 1 when wt = h, and the candidate dies. Although any increasing function
serves the purpose of the idea that the benefit from transplant increases as the kidney quality
increases, we use for simplicity here a linear form

B(h, q) = mh q,
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(2.2)

Figure 2.5. The waitlist queuing model in our proposed system.

where mh indicates the best outcome of a candidate with health level h, which occurs when
the highest possible quality kidney is transplanted to her immediately after joining the active
set.
Assumption 4 We assume that the decision maker uses a simple threshold policy by accepting all kidneys with quality q ≥ k, where k is the chosen threshold.
Proposition 1 If the decision maker faces kidneys being offered following a Poisson process
with rate µo and the kidney quality is drawn from random variable Q, then the arrival of
acceptable kidneys (q ≥ k) also follows a Poisson process with rate µa = µo P (Q ≥ k).
2

Proof: Proof See [66].

The wait time is a random variable W (k) following an exponential distribution with
parameter µa , i.e., W (k) ∼ exp(µa ). The probability that the candidate has to wait longer
that a given wait time wt is given by P (W (k) ≤ wt ) = FW (k) (wt ). We can find the wt which
will not be exceeded with probability αc .

−1
wt = F W
(k) (αc ) =

1
ln 1−α
c

µo P (Q ≥ k)

(2.3)

αc captures the decision maker’s risk preference and increases as the decision maker
becomes more conservative and risk averse in terms of wait time. For candidates this reflects
the risk of deteriorating health and for centers it means risk of loosing a patient on the
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waitlist. In the following, we derive all results based on risk neutrality (i.e., αc = 1 − 1e ),
meaning that wt is the expected time until a kidney of minimum quality k is accepted given
by

wt = E[W (k)] =

1
.
µo P (Q ≥ k)

The results can be easily extended based on different levels of risk preference among
decision makers.
To calculate the expected utility with respect to the expected wait time, we need to
estimate the cost of deterioration C(h, wt ), which is a function of the candidate’s health and
the time the candidate has to wait for the transplant. For simplicity, we also use linear
deterioration with no deterioration if the wait time is zero and maximal deterioration when
the wait time approaches h, the expected remaining life time on dialysis.

C (h, wt ) =

1
wt
h

(2.4)

The expected utility for selecting a kidney of quality q ≥ k is then
R1
c

E[U ] =

k

U c (h, q, k)f (q)dq
R1
f (q)dq
k

(2.5)

where f (·) is the kidney quality distribution function. For simplification, let’s assume that
kidney quality scores are scaled such that the distribution of Q is uniform resulting in
P (Q ≥ k) = 1 − k. This is a common assumption in the literature, since the KDPI score,
which reflects kidney quality, is by construction close to uniformly distributed.
Substituting (3.1)-(2.4) into (2.5) the expected utility is given by
mh
E[U ] =
2
c




1
1 − wt (k + 1).
h
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(2.6)

2.4. Acceptance decisions
Several parties are involved in the kidney transplantation process. In this section we
derive optimal organ acceptance decisions for the two parties involved in making acceptance
decision, namely the candidate and the provider and compare them to the outcome desired
by the social planner, who is interested in the utility created by the whole transplantation
system.
The actual decision is made by the candidate and the provider together and the decision
requires that both agree. However, it is reasonable to assume that many candidates will
trust the recommendation of their provider.

2.4.1. Candidate’s optimal decision
Each candidate tries to use a decision strategy to optimize her utility. For a threshold
strategy this can be formulated as the optimization problem

max E[U c ]
k

s.t.

(2.7)

0≤k≤1
0 ≤ w(t) ≤ h,
where E[U c ] is the candidate’s total expected utility to accept a kidney of minimum quality
k.
Proposition 2 The optimal kidney acceptance decision under different risk preferences expressed by αc is
s
∗

k =

kc∗

=1−

1
2ln 1−α
c

µo h

.

(2.8)
2

Proof: Proof See Appendix B.1.

The optimal threshold in (2.13) is influenced by both donor kidney supply and the can26

didate’s health. A healthier candidate (higher h value) demands a higher quality kidney.
Moreover, in case of increase in kidney supply, which results in a higher offer rate, the candidate would become more selective regarding the kidney quality. A risk-averse candidate
(with αc < 1 − 1e ) has a tendency to set a lower kc∗ threshold reducing the risk of long waiting
time, while a risk-seeking candidate (with αc > 1 − 1e ) is willing to wait longer for a better
kidney.

2.4.2. Provider’s optimal decision
Although the provider is interested in the best transplant decision for candidates, the
decision of accepting donor kidneys might be influenced by other factors as well. The other
benefits associated with transplantation such as innovation, financial motivation and learning by experience contain enough incentives to create misalignment between social planner
objectives and provider’s incentives. We first derive the optimal decision rule, expressed as
a threshold on q, for a completely self-interested provider and then introduce the case when
a provider’s tendency of benevolence increases.
2.4.2.0.1

Completely self-interested provider.

We assume that every provider

receives a fixed benefit B for each transplant. A self-interested provider has an incentive
to perform a transplant and thus receive this benefit before a candidate departs the system
due to death on the waitlist or being delisted for other reasons. Therefore, the provider’s
expected utility for using a threshold k for a candidate with health h is
E[U p ] = B P (W (k) ≤ h),

(2.9)

where the random variable W (k) represents the expected wait time on dialysis since the
candidate joined the queue till she receives an offer of a kidney with quality q ≥ k. A shown
above, the wait time W (kp ) has an exponential distribution with parameter µo P (Q ≥ k)
which depends this time on the provider’s threshold k. Hence, using a threshold of k for a
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candidate with health h generates the expected provider utility of
p

Z

h

µo (1 − k) exp (µo (1 − k) t) dt

E[U ] = B

(2.10)

0

Proposition 3 A self-interested provider maximizes his total expected utility by setting the
kidney quality threshold to the lowest possible kidney quality, i.e., by accepting any kidney.

Proof: Proof Since (2.10) is strictly decreasing with respect to k, the optimal choice for
the provider is to always accept the first donor kidney offered by OPTN, regardless of the
kidney’s quality. In other words, if OPTN offers kidneys with a minimum quality of k, the
provider sets his kidney quality threshold to
k ∗ = kp∗ = k.

(2.11)
2

2.4.2.0.2

Self-interested vs. altruistic providers.

Clearly, providers are not

completely self-interested and care about their patients. A completely altruistic provider
would choose the quality threshold that optimizes the patient utility, while a purely selfinterested provider always accepts any kidney. To model the fact that the actual decision
threshold kt applied by the provider can be affected by its expected utility and the candidate’s
utility by

kt = δ kc∗ + (1 − δ) kp∗ ,

(2.12)

where δ represents the provider’s degree of benevolence in the range 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Here, the
provider can choose depending on his incentive to obtain maximum benefit from transplant
(i.e., completely self-interested with δ = 0) as opposed to contribute to the best social
outcome (i.e., completely altruistic with δ = 1). The expected utility given up by an altruistic
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provider is
E[U p (h, k)] − E[U p (h, kt )]
while the candidate gains an expected utility of
E[U c (h, kt )] − E[U c (h, k)].

2.4.3. Social planner’s objective
The social planner is interested in maximizing social welfare which means optimizing the
whole system in terms of realized utility. The system contains the candidates, the providers
and the payers. Since the provider’s financial benefits come from payers, they cancel each
other out and we can concentrate on the candidates’ utility.
Proposition 4 In a setting without direct competition between candidates, the total posttransplant expected utility over the entire population, i.e., the social welfare utility function, is
maximized if and only if each candidate optimizes her individual utility under risk neutrality.

Proof: Proof Since our model does not consider effects of competition between candidates,

S=

N
X

E[Uic ],

i=1

it is easy to see that the sum is maximized when each individual candidate maximizes her
own post-transplant expected utility.
2

Lemma 2.1 The optimal threshold for kidney quality that maximizes the expected utility of
a candidate with health h under risk-neutrality is
ks∗

r
=1−
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2
.
µo h

(2.13)

2

Proof: Proof See Appendix B.2.

If the candidate is risk neutral and the provider completely altruistic then all involved
parties have the same optimal decision threshold ks∗ = kc∗ = kt and the system would be
optimal without intervention. However, if not completely altruistic providers with kt < ks∗
convince the candidate to accept a lower quality kidney, then the candidate looses utility and
social welfare is not maximized resulting in social loss. This happens because incentives are
not aligned between the provider and the candidate or social planner. In this case regulatory
oversight is needed to align incentives and reduce social loss.

2.5. Optimal regulatory oversight
In this section, we identify factors that affect regulatory oversight, investigate the relationship among factors to introduce an optimal citation policy (CP) for low-performing
providers. We demonstrate how a CP influences accepting offered kidneys by the provider,
i.e., how it changes kp . An optimal citation program must be strong enough to encourage
the provider to prioritize candidates’ outcomes from transplantation over all other potential
incentives, however it should not cause any risk-averse behavior which might lead to limited
access to care for ESRD candidates. Since CPs are usually based on post-transplant survival
of the candidate or the kidney, we first introduce a post-transplant survival model.

2.5.1. Post-transplant survival
We define the continuous random variable T to represent the time until the occurrence of
an event of interest to the regulator, such as kidney failure or candidate loss after transplantation. We define g(t) and G(t) to be the probability density function and the cumulative
distribution function of T , respectively. The standard survival function is defined as
Z
S(t) = P (T > t) = 1 − G(t) =

∞

g(x)dx,

(2.14)

t

where S(t) is the probability of the candidate being alive up to time t. The hazard function
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or instantaneous rate of occurrence of the event is
P (T ≤ t + dt|T ≥ t)
.
dt→0
dt

(2.15)

S(t) = exp(−λ(t)).

(2.16)

λ(t) = lim

And S(t) written in terms of λ(t) is

The numerator in (2.15) is the conditional probability that the event of interest occurs in
the time interval [t, t + dt) given that it has not happened before, and the denominator is
the width of the interval. Using a constant risk over the first one-year post-transplant period
for kidney of quality q ≥ k, we define the hazard function as

λ(q, h, t) = λ(q, h)

for all t ≤ 1

. The reason that t is dropped form the hazard function is that we assume constant risk over
the relatively short period of one year. We model λ(q, h) by the functional form λ0h q. Since
the exact quality q of the accepted kidney is unknown, we use the expectation over q ≥ k,

λ(q, h) = λ0h (1 − E[Q|Q ≥ k]) = λh (1 − k).

(2.17)

The hazard function is decreasing in k, which reflects the fact that as the quality of the
accepted kidney increases, the risk of post-transplant kidney failure decreases. The resulting
survival function for one-year post transplant survival is

S(k, h, t) = exp (−λh (1 − k))

for all t ≤ 1,

(2.18)

and the failure function (i.e., the probability of failure) is defined as

F (kp , h, t) = 1 − S(k, h, t)
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for all t ≤ 1.

(2.19)

Detailed derivations are given in Appendix B.3. Note that different formulations of the
hazard function with non-constant risk and different functional forms can be easily used.

2.5.2. Provider’s decision policy under regulatory oversight
We model the impact of a citation strategy imposed by a regulator on behavior of
providers toward accepting kidney offers for their candidates. The total expected net utility
of performing a transplant under a given citation policy CP is
E[U p ] = [B − Cp P (citation)] P (W (k) ≤ h),

(2.20)

where B is a fixed benefit for the transplantation, Cp is the cost of being cited as lowperforming by the regulator, and P (citation) is the estimated probability of the event of
being cited as a result of performing the transplanting. P (W (k) ≤ h) is the probability that
he candidate receives a transplantation in time when setting a threshold of k.
Next, we need to find the probability of being cited. The regulator will only cite a
provider if an adverse event, here called a failure, occurs. However not all failures will lead
to being cited (e.g, the loss of a very sick patient should). The probability of being cited can
be expressed by Bayes’ theorem

P (citation) =

P (citation | failure) P (failure)
.
P (failure | citation)

(2.21)

Since the provider is only cited for the candidate if a failure occurs, the following always
holds P (failure | citation) = 1. The failure probability can be estimated by the provider using
historic data, expert knowledge or the survival function defined above. A failure is considered
if the post-transplant survival is less than a year, leading to P (failure) = F (k, h, t). We will
use fp = P (citation | failure) for the probability of being cited given a failure.
Using fp and the survival function in (2.18) for P (citation) in (2.20), the net expected
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utility can be written as
E[U p ] = (B − Cp fp (1 − exp(−λh (1 − kp )))) P (W (k) ≤ h).

(2.22)

Assumption 5 The provider will not set a kidney quality threshold kp that makes the expected net benefit of the transplantation negative, i.e., the transplantation would reduce the
provider’s expected overall profit.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 5, the provider’s optimal kidney quality threshold under
regulatory oversight, which leads to a positive expected utility, is
∗
kp|CP



B
1
ln 1 −
.
=1+
λh
Cp fp

(2.23)

2

Proof: Proof See Appendix (B.4).

The regulator has control over Cp and fp and thus can influence the optimal threshold
∗
chosen by the provider. Next, we will define the optimal citation policy and discuss
kp|CP

the role of Cp and fp .
2.5.3. Optimal citation mechanism
The optimal citation mechanism needs to be designed to incentivize the provider to choose
for each candidate the socially optimal kidney quality threshold. That is
∗
kp|CP
= ks∗ .

(2.24)

Proposition 6 The optimal value of Cp fp denoted as [Cp fp ]∗ to achieve (2.24) for a single
candidate is
B

[Cp fp ]∗ =



1 − exp −λh

q

2
µo h



(2.25)

2

Proof: Proof See Appendix (B.5).
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Cp are the costs the regulator imposes on a provider that gets cited. These costs can
include the cost for the personal and needed time to go through a quality review or a systems
improvement agreement. The cost can also include the lost future revenue in case a provider
is excluded from future organ transplantations. Alternatively, Cp could also be implemented
as a direct fine or repayment of received transplantation fees. The severity and amount
imposed by Cp is under the regulators control. The probability of getting cited in case of
an adverse event fp represents how strict the citation policy is. In the most extreme case of
fp = 1, every adverse event will lead to a citation and Cp will be imposed. The optimal value
[Cp fp ]∗ represents all possible combinations of Cp and fp for which Cp fp = [Cp fp ]∗ , i.e., the
same impact can be achieved with every combination of Cp and fp that keeps the product
constant. This presents the regulator with a set of equivalent citation policies ranging from
citing more frequently imposing as lower cost to citing less frequently imposing higher cost
per citation.
Equation (2.25) also shows that as the provider’s benefit B per transplant increases, the
regulator needs to adjust their strategy accordingly to avoid deviation of provider’s optimal
decision form the social optimum. Furthermore, according to (2.25), increasing h requires a
higher value for [Cp fp ]∗ . This corresponds to the need of risk-adjustment, i.e., the optimal
citation policy needs to penalizing providers for loss of healthier candidates more than the loss
of sicker ones. This is because by nature, the mortality rate among the high-risk population
is higher than that of the low-risk population. Similarly, in (2.25), increasing µo increases
[Cp fp ]∗ . As kidney supply increases, the regulator can expect to see better outcome since
more choices are now available to the candidate and the transplantation center to select
desired kidneys from.
After defining the optimal CP, we need to consider the cases of insufficiently intense and
over-intense CPs.
Corollary 1 If a given citation policy is insufficiently intense, i.e., Cp fp < [Cp fp ]∗ , altruistic providers will keep their kidney quality threshold at ks∗ , and non-completely altruistic
providers will set their optimal kidney quality thresholds in the range of [kt , ks∗ ). If a given
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citation policy is over-intense, i.e., Cp fp > [Cp fp ]∗ , all providers will set their kidney quality
threshold in the range of (ks∗ , 1].
2

Proof: Proof Follows directly from (2.23).

While insufficiently intense CPs affect only providers that are not completely altruistic,
all providers are affected by over-intense CPs. This supports the argument that too strict
report cards will have a negative effect on transplantations. If the citation policy does not
take supply and demand in the region of the provider into account, then an over-intense
citation policy is more likely to be observed among transplant centers that have a high
demand-to-supply ratio (DSR). Lower deceased donor organ donation rate (supply) is one of
the essential elements that influence DSR. The second element is the number of waitlisted
candidates (demand). Transplant centers that are located in regions with might be at a
higher risk of being unfairly citied, leading them to perform less transplantations with higherquality kidneys to reduce their risk of being cited.

2.6. Optimal candidate admission policy
After modeling the kidney acceptance decision, we model the decision by the provider to
accept a candidate to their wait list. Although this decision precedes the kidney acceptance
decision, we present it here in this order, because expectations about the wait time and
outcomes of the transplantation inform the candidate acceptance decision. To be eligible for
a transplantation, the candidate need to be referred to a transplant center by a nephrologist.
The transplant team evaluates candidate’s physical and mental health and if she is identified
to be eligible for transplantation, she will be enlisted in both the transplant center’s and the
national waitlist. In this section, we model the decision by a provider to accept candidates
to their center and thus adding them to the waitlist. We are interested in how this decision
is influenced by the citation program.
We assume that that the center will only accept a patient if the candidate is expected to
survive till transplant. The transplant team finds the minimum candidate required health
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threshold at the time of evaluation, i.e., h in Figure 2.4, and enlist the candidate if her health
score exceeds this threshold. The candidate’s health deterioration over time can be modeled
by a survival function. To estimate the candidate’s survival on the wait list until transplant
time, i.e., S w (h0 , t), we have to consider two time frames. The first time frame is represented
by w0 , the estimated wait time until the candidate reaches the active set of the queue which
consists of N active candidates who are receiving donor kidney offers. The second time
frame, the expected time till an acceptable offer is received by the active candidate, wt , is
defined analogous to (2.3), but the provider uses this time his probability threshold αp to
find the wait time for receiving a kidney of the provider’s minimum quality kc∗ that is not
exceeded with probability αp . Since w0 does not depend on the individual candidate, but
rather on the rate with which the candidates leave the waitlist, these two wait times are
independent. The probabilities of candidate survival until transplant and death on dialysis
are respectively defined as

S w (h0 , t) = exp −

!

w0 +wt

Z

λw (h0 , t)dt

and
(2.26)

0

F w (h0 , t) = 1 − S w (h0 , t).
From the definition of health h0 as the remaining time the candidate can receive dialysis,
health deterioration after time t is h0 − t. That is, at time t = 0 the candidate has a life
expectancy on dialysis equal to h0 , and as time approaches to h0 the candidate’s remaining
life expectancy approaches 0. We define the hazard function for the pre-transplant period,
i.e., the period from the time the candidate is accepted on the waitlist until she receives a
transplant, to be inversely proportional to the candidate’s health deterioration function
λw (h0 , t) =

h0

1
.
−t

(2.27)

To make the optimal candidate acceptance decision to the center’s waitlist, the provider
will accept a candidate if the expected benefit of accepting her, B 0 S w (h0 , t), becomes greater
then the expected cost of loosing her before transplantation, C 0 F w (h0 , t), i.e.,
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B 0 S w (h0 , t) ≥ C 0 F w (h0 , t),

(2.28)

where C 0 represents all cost associated with loosing the patient including the cost of negative
reputation caused by higher waitlist mortality rate.
Proposition 7 The provider’s optimal health threshold to accept a candidate to the center’s
waitlist given risk preference αp is
!




1
0
ln 1−α
C
C0
p
w0 +
h ≥ 1 + 0 0 (w0 + wt ) = 1 + 0 0
Bw
Bw
µo (1 − k)
0∗

(2.29)

2

Proof: Proof See Appendix (B.6).

The provider’s decision of accepting candidates to the waitlist is sensitive to the kidney
supply µo . The increase in the availability of donor kidneys gives the provider a higher chance
of performing more transplants. To increase the transplant volume, the provider would have
0

to accept more candidates to the waitlist by lowering candidate’s health index threshold h ∗ .
According to (2.29), the more the provider is concerned about obtaining and maintaining
high reputation among their peers and candidates for having a low mortality rate on the
waitlist (represented by αp ), the more cautious and selective they become to accept candidates. Increasing αp by the provider makes it harder for high-risk candidates to be enlisted
0

since h ∗ has a direct relation to αp . The consequence of expecting higher-quality kidneys
(k) leads providers to become more selective on enlisting a candidate to the waitlist. That
being said, under the influence of quality oversight, the provider will require a higher k to
improve expected post-transplant outcomes and this will set a higher health threshold for
their candidate selection policy. This reflects the sentiment that to strict quality oversight
may restrict access to transplantation services for patients with lower health.

2.7. Impact of changes to the kidney allocation system
In this section, we analyze the impact of the changes to the kidney allocation system
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(we refer to it as the new or current KAS or simply KAS) introduced in 2007 on optimal
transplant decisions in both stages of the kidney transplantation process, the candidate
acceptance to a center and kidney acceptance decision. We also investigate changes the
regulatory agency would need to make to adapt their optimal citation policy as a result of
the new KAS.

2.7.1. Kidney transplant decision
We start again with discussing the kidney transplantation decision first. Under the old
KAS, all candidates had equal access to all kidneys. The new KAS implements an access
policy with preferential treatment of certain groups. It is implemented as a simple threshold
strategy where the top 20 percent of kidneys with KDPI ∈ [0, 0.2] are offered first to the top
20 percent most healthiest candidates with EPTS ∈ [0, 0.2]. The idea is that, from a social
planner’s perspective, using the best kidneys for the best candidates will result in better
total outcomes in terms of the total utility over the whole system.
To model this system, we classify candidate’s population into low- and high-risk classes
by using the KAS threshold introduced by OPTN on the kidney quality q of π = 0.8. In our
model, the top-quality kidneys fall in the range of [π, 1]. As KDPI, the kidney quality q has a
close to uniform distribution and thus all the recovered kidneys with quality q ≥ π (i.e., top
20 percent of kidneys or low-risk kidneys) are assigned to the low-risk class, and harvested
kidneys with quality q < π are distributed among all (both low-and high risk class). Now
we can modify our model to show the impact of exclusively assigning the top 20 percent of
kidneys (low-risk kidneys) to the top 20 percent of candidates (low-risk candidates).

2.7.1.1. Low-risk candidate
The kidney arrival process is modeled as a Poisson process with an arrival rate of µ.
Top-quality (low-risk) kidneys arrive with a rate of µ1 = µP (Q ≥ π) and low-quality (highrisk) kidneys arrive with a rate of µ2 = µP (Q < π). Under the new KAS, low-risk kidneys
are exclusively offered to low-risk candidates and are shared among the Nl = (1 − π)N
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low-risk candidates in the active set. The low-quality kidneys get assigned to either one of
the Nl active low-risk candidates or one of the Nh = πN active high-risk candidates. For
simplification, we believe that low-risk kidneys have such high quality that any candidate
and center will accept them for transplantation. Since they are only offered to low-risk
candidates this can be represented by the constraint kl ≤ π where kl is kidney quality
threshold of low-risk candidate post KAS. Also, high-risk candidates will not demand a
better kidney than low-risk candidates resulting in kh ≤ kl where kh is high-risk candidate
kidney quality threshold post KAS. This second constraint is always met by our previous
model and we will show that it is also automatically satisfied by the new KAS model.
The rate with which acceptable (q ≥ kl ) kidneys are offered to low-risk candidate can be
calculated as
µla =

µ2
µ1
P (Q≥π ≥ kl ) +
P (Q<π ≥ kl ).
Nl
Nl + Nh

(2.30)

Note that P (Q≥π ≥ kl ) and P (Q<π ≥ kl ) represent the probability of Q truncated above
and below π to be greater than kl , respectively.
Substituting the probability values with a uniform distribution for Q, and N = Nl + Nh
gives
µla =

µ
(1 + π − kl ).
N

(2.31)

Since this constitutes a thinned Poisson process with rate µla , wl (kl ), i.e., the expected
wait time until an acceptable kidney offer under KAS implementation is

wl (kl ) =

1
.
µla

(2.32)

The total post-transplant expected utility for a low-risk candidate using the KAS kidney
assignment is derived as follow:
Rπ
E[Ulc ] = P (Q < π)

kl

R1
P (Q ≥ π)

π
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Ulc (h, q, k)f (q)dq
Rπ
+
f (q)dq
k
Ulc (h, q, k)f (q)dq
R1
f (q)dq
π

(2.33)

Proposition 8 The optimal kidney quality threshold of a low-risk candidate under KAS is
s
kl∗

=1+π−

1 + 2π
.
µ
h
N

(2.34)

2

Proof: Proof See Appendix (B.7).

Corollary 2 Under the new KAS implementation, the low-risk candidate increases the kidney quality threshold kl∗ compare to the pre-KAS optimal kidney quality threshold ks∗ .
2

Proof: Proof See Appendix (B.8).

The justification of this behavioral change is given by the fact that the new KAS limits the
competition for top-quality kidneys to only low-risk candidates while they still have access
to both high- and low-quality kidneys. In this setting, the offer rate of an individual lowrisk candidate increases, resulting in an effective supply increase for her. Thus, a candidate
advantaged by the system will demand a higher kidney quality.

2.7.1.2. High-risk candidate
Under the new KAS, higher-risk candidates have access only to lower-quality donor kidneys. The arrival rate of this kidney type is µ2 = µ P (Q < π). Since all N active candidates
get offers for these kidneys the offer rate is

µ2
.
N

The acceptance rate and the expected wait

time are thus
µha =

µ2
µπ
P (Q<π ≥ kh ) =
(π − kh ).
N
N

wh (kh ) =
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1
.
µha

(2.35)

(2.36)

The post transplant expected utility function is
Rπ
E(Uhc ) =

kh

Uh (h, q, k)f (q)dq
Rπ
.
f (q)dq
kh

(2.37)

Proposition 9 The optimal kidney quality threshold of a high-risk candidate under KAS is
s
kh∗ = π −

2
µ
h
N

(2.38)

2

Proof: Proof See Appendix (B.9).

High-risk candidates respond to a threshold-based KAS by also accepting kidneys of lower
quality as before because top-quality kidneys are no longer accessible to this group. The
report published in [60] shows that after the introduction of a threshold-based KAS with
π = 0.8, the kidney discard rate decreased. The model comes to the same conclusion, since
higher-risk candidates reduce their kidney quality requirements and will now accept kidneys
that would have been discarded before.

2.7.2. Candidate acceptance decision
As shown in Section 2.7.1, under KAS, the rates at which candidates receive kidney
offers change, which changes their optimal decision thresholds kl∗ and kh∗ , accordingly. The
candidate selection strategy which is influenced by both kidney supply (i.e., kidney offer
rate) µo and kidney quality threshold is also subject to change as a result of executing KAS.
We trust that the provider accepts all candidates who are identified as low-risk and only
makes a decision on high-risk ones. Even though we only modeled above two classes of
candidates, those within each class are heterogeneous and will have different health at the
time of evaluation. According to (2.29), the candidate’s selection strategy post KAS, i.e.
0

∗
hkas
, evolves in the following way.
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Proposition 10 Under the assumptions that w0 and αp remain the same under pre and
0

∗
and so only accepts
post KAS, the provider increases their candidate’s quality threshold, hkas

healthier candidates among high risk candidates.

0

0

∗
>h∗
hkas

(2.39)
2

Proof: Proof See Appendix (B.10).

2.7.3. Citation policy
The regulatory agency needs to take into consideration that after implementing KAS the
assessment criteria of evaluating transplant program’s performance needs to be adjusted.
As shown in Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2, optimal transplant-related decisions have changed due
to the effect of the introduction of KAS on kidney supply. These decisions have a major
impact on post-transplant results. In our citation model, the optimally imposed cost and the
citation probability depend on the kidney supply, individual offer rate, and social optimum.
Since all these three factors have changed after implementing KAS, the optimal combination
[Cp fp ]∗ also need to be appropriately adjusted to align providers’ incentives with candidates’
optimal outcomes under KAS.
Proposition 11 The new KAS optimal citation policy for low- and high-risk candidates are

[Cp fp ]∗lkas =

B

q
1 − exp −λh ( 2π+1
−
π)
µo h


and

[Cp fp ]∗hkas =
1 − exp

B

q
−λh
π

2
µo h

,

respectively.
Proof: Proof By substituting the new kidney arrival rates, individual (low- and high-risk)
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offer rates (equations 2.31 and 2.35) and the corresponding wait time expectations (equations
2.32 and 2.36), one can derive the optimal citation policy [Cp fp ]∗kas .

2

As a result, the risk-adjustment outcome should be modified in a way that the provider
is penalized by either lower cost or a lower chance for making an unsuccessful graft to a
high-risk candidate.

2.8. Empirical analysis
This study uses data from the annual reports published by UNOS (national kidney waiting list) and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipient (SRTR) (clinical data). The
SRTR data system contains detailed medical and demographic data for all donors, waitlisted candidates and transplant recipients in the United States, submitted by the members
of OPTN between October 1987 and the end of 2016. The numerical illustration and data
analysis conducted in this chapter is based on 395,950 patients who are first-time recipients
of deceased donor kidney transplants.

2.8.1. Parameter estimation
In the following we discuss how the parameters used in the model were estimated.

2.8.1.1.

Kidney Donor Profile Index.

To estimate the quality of donor kidney, q, we use the Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI)
for each kidney. KDPI incorporates ten clinical and demographical kidney donor factors and
provides a predictive measure of donor kidney quality. Information on donor age, height,
weight, ethnicity, history of hypertension and diabetes, serum Creatinine, Hepatitis C Virus
(HCV) status, Donation after Circulatory Death (DCD) status, and cause of death are
retrieved from our SRTR data set. We follow [56] to calculate KDPI. For example, a KDPI
of 82% means the estimated risk of post-transplant kidney failure from this donor is higher
than 82% of kidney donors recovered in that year. For our model, the kidney quality q is
estimated as q = 1 − KDPI. Since KDPI is close to uniformly distributed by construction,
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kidney quality also follows a uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1].

2.8.1.2. Estimated Post Transplant Survival.
The Estimated Post-Transplant Survival (EP T S) score is a numerical measure of a candidate’s post-transplant survival which incorporates four risk factors including age, diabetes
status, prior solid organ transplant, and time on dialysis using a Cox proportional hazards
model [55]. EPTS scores range from 0% to 100% and are an indicator of how long a candidate
would need a functioning kidney transplant when compared with other candidates. Zero is
the best EPTS score and candidates with higher EPTS scores are more likely to live fewer
years with a functioning kidney compared to those with lower EPTS scores. For instance, a
candidate with an EPTS score of 60 percent will likely need a kidney with a lifespan longer
than the 40 percent candidates with a higher EPTS score.
We use the candidates EPTS score to estimate the hazard rate, λh . According to the
literature [55], the average post-transplant kidney survival is between 8 to 12 years. To
implement an average survival of 10 years and the fact that the mean time to failure for
a constant hazard rate of λ is 1/λ, we use the following simplified functional relationship:
λh =

1
.
10(1−EPTS)

A candidate with the best EPTS score of 0 has a hazard rate of 0.1,

and as a candidate’s EPTS score increases, the hazard rate also increases. The estimation
is based on the best EPTS score, because patients with higher scores are also more likely
to receive a transplantation before leaving the waitlist. Given post-transplant survival data,
λh can be estimated directly from the data using methods like the Cox proportional hazards
regression.

2.8.1.3. Candidate life expectancy on dialysis.
Based on the USRDS report [84], we use two candidate risk factors, age and race, to
estimate a candidates life expectancy on dialysis when she enlists with a center (h0 ). To
calculate h, i.e., candidate’s life expectancy when she joins the top-N list, we first estimate
w0 , which is the expected wait time from being accepted by a center until the candidate
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joins the top-N list from the data. This wait time is not directly observable. For estimation,
we subtract the model’s expected wait time in the top-N list until the candidate accepts a
kidney with a quality threshold of kt from the total observed wait time, i.e., h = h0 − w0 .
This relationship can also be seen in Figure 2.4 on page 22.

2.8.2. Effect of regulatory oversight on provider’s transplant decision
On March 30, 2007, CMS issued regulations and conditions of participation (CoP) for
hospital-based kidney transplant programs that took effect on June 28, 2007. The new requirements move Medicare-covered transplant programs toward an outcome-focused system
that reflects the clinical experience, resources, and commitment of each transplant program.
Figure 2.6 displays candidate’s life expectancy on dialysis (health) and the expected wait
time till receiving a kidney transplant. The average observed wait time till kidney transplant
after 2007 over the entire population (11 regions) has increased by 194 days (from 587 to
780) which results in a reduction of waitlisted candidate’s health by six months on average.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the introduction of CoP negatively affected
transplantation programs. According to [1] between 2005 and 2014 the number of active
candidates grew on average by 2% annually (before and after the introduction of CoP) an
in total by 29% which led to increases in Demand to Supply Ratio (DSR). If the waitlist
growth is independent of the introduction of CoP, then it could also explain the observed
longer wait times, lower health, and lower utility. As a reaction to the lower supply, we would
expect self-interested providers to drop their k ∗ . However, we observed that the providers
kept the k ∗ constant or even increased it slightly as a reaction to the introduction of the
CoP. This moves the k ∗ closer to the new the social optimum and signals an improvement
and a positive effect of the CoP. The model indicates that the drop in utility is actually
due to external factors, and that without CoP, the utility would have dropped even more
significantly.
Table 2.1 summarizes transplant outcomes (averages) before and after CoP implementation in 2007 for each region and compares the observed changes with the social optimal
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Figure 2.6.

Average waitlisted candidate health and wait time before and after CoP

Table 2.1. Transplant outcome and statistic before and after CoP (2007)
Outcomes before CoP
Observed

Social optimal

Observed

Social optimal

Utility

k

Utility

k∗

Utility

0.64

12.27

0.56

10.37

0.6

11.12

11.21

0.66

12.63

0.52

10.58

0.62

11.61

0.57

13.02

0.73

14.21

0.55

11.78

0.69

12.87

4

0.57

12.70

0.72

13.78

0.60

11.94

0.69

12.74

5

0.55

11.69

0.66

12.72

0.55

11.13

0.63

12.00

6

0.55

13.02

0.73

14.41

0.61

11.50

0.67

12.25

7

0.52

11.77

0.67

12.99

0.55

10.74

0.61

11.60

8

0.61

13.01

0.73

13.98

0.62

11.73

0.69

12.66

9

0.48

11.00

0.60

12.17

0.48

9.53

0.53

10.40

10

0.57

12.83

0.73

14.06

0.58

11.60

0.68

12.54

11

0.56

12.47

0.69

13.53

0.57

11.39

0.65

12.36

Average

0.55

12.19

0.69

13.34

0.56

11.12

0.64

12.01

Region

k

Utility

k

1

0.56

11.34

2

0.47

3

∗

Outcomes after CoP
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outcomes when the optimal threshold policies k ∗ are used. As a result of candidate’s health
reduction due to longer wait time and lower DSR, the social optimum kidney quality threshold given by the model has decreased by 5%. Interestingly, not only the quality of observed
accepted kidneys decreased (indicating that both, the providers and candidates are willing to
accept lower quality kidneys), but the observed k increases by 1% on average while the highest increase of 5% happens in region 2. One of the applications of our model is to provide a
framework to evaluate the efficiency of CoP. Without taking into account the effect of donor
kidney supply and demand on the transplant decisions, it might be difficult to capture the
true effect of transplant center’s performance assessment in a dynamic environment where
the waitlist may grow over time. If one only compares the average of accepted kidney quality
in table 2.1 as an evaluation metric of CoP usefulness, we might find CoP to be detrimental
since there is a reduction in the realized utility. However, considering the social optimum
dependency upon the availability of donor organs and total demand can help explain the
observed utility reduction. Next, we will illustrate how our model allows comparing these
two systems (before and after CoP) and extracting an appropriate and practical conclusion
even with changes in waitlist length which results in changes in wait length and patient
health.
To assess the effect of performance assessment on provider’s response to kidney transplantation decisions and outcomes, we measure social loss, deficiency, and degree of benevolence
for each candidate. Table 2.2 contains the average results of performance measurements
for before and after COPs implementation. The social loss is defined as the difference between the social welfare utility function’s value given a social optimal kidney transplant
decision(ks∗ ), and the provider’s decision observed from data (kt ).
Social loss = E(U c |ks∗ ) − E(U c |kt )

(2.40)

We define deficiency as the relative difference of the expected utility using the providers
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Table 2.2. Provider’s performance comparison
Proivder’s
risk prefrence

Social loss

Deficiency

Degree of
benevolence

Averages before CoP introduction

0.73

1.15

0.09

0.80

Averages after CoP introduction

0.69

0.89

0.07

0.87

Changes

-5%

-22%

-14%

+9%

decision, E(U c |kt ), with respect to expected utility under the social optimal decision, E(U c |ks∗ ).
Deficiency =

E(U c |ks∗ ) − E(U c |kt )
E(U c |ks∗ )

(2.41)

The degree of benevolence δ is calculated by solving the following equation.
kt = (1 − δ)kp∗ + δks∗

(2.42)

Note that by definition kp∗ is equal to zero resulting in δ = kt /ks∗ . Our analysis on
provider’s performance indicates that the introduction of the score card has on average
decreased the social loss and deficiency by almost three months and 14%, respectively, and
the degree of benevolence has increased by 9%. Also we observe 22% reduction in social loss
and provider’s risk preference moved by 5% closer towards risk neutrality. This shows that
the introduction of the CoP had a positive effect that was masked by the increase of the
number of candidates waiting for transplant.

2.8.3. The optimal citation policy
In this section, we analyze the effect of suboptimal citation policy on the kidney acceptance decisions. We estimate the current citation policy Cp fp using provider’s data to assess
whether the current evaluation system is close to the optimal policy, Cp∗ fp∗ . In case the
current performance assessment is not optimal, we measure how far it is from the optimal
citation policy and how much it needs to change to reach the optimal goal.
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Table 2.3. Optimal citation policy
Data
Offer

Region

rate

Provider
Wait

h

time

Citation

Social Optimal

k

Utility

PF

Cp fp

Expected
Cost

k

Utility

PF

∗f ∗
Cp
p

Policy
Expected

Delta

Cost

1

5.57

5.05

834

0.56

10.37

0.051

$259,302

$6,259

0.60

11.12

0.049

$289,292

$5,000

-$1,259

2

5.99

4.98

818

0.52

10.58

0.055

$228,077

$7,392

0.62

11.61

0.047

$288,030

$5,000

-$2,392

3

8.51

5.49

728

0.55

11.78

0.045

$274,472

$8,132

0.69

12.87

0.034

$367,216

$5,000

-$3,132

4

7.99

5.63

627

0.60

11.94

0.044

$283,909

$7,080

0.69

12.74

0.037

$343,089

$5,000

-$2,080

5

4.87

5.72

904

0.55

11.13

0.049

$267,067

$6,840

0.63

12.00

0.044

$315,082

$5,000

-$1,840

6

10.45

5.21

677

0.61

11.50

0.046

$272,461

$6,790

0.67

12.25

0.042

$317,394

$5,000

-$1,790

7

5.64

5.27

920

0.55

10.74

0.05

$256,210

$6,746

0.61

11.60

0.047

$303,094

$5,000

-$1,746

8

14.02

5.26

658

0.59

11.73

0.044

$284,139

$7,632

0.69

12.66

0.035

$358,202

$5,000

-$2,632

9

3.41

5.05

945

0.48

9.53

0.059

$218,991

$6,298

0.53

10.40

0.058

$244,518

$5,000

-$1,298

10

10.37

5.14

753

0.58

11.60

0.045

$268,734

$7,643

0.68

12.54

0.037

$343,209

$5,000

-$2,643

11

5.13

5.58

718

0.54

11.39

0.048

$263,215

$7,277

0.65

12.36

0.039

$324,950

$5,000

-$2,277

Average

7.45

5.31

780

0.56

11.12

0.05

$261,507

$7,099

0.64

12.01

0.04

$317,643

$5,000

-$2,099

Table 2.4. Comparison of overintense and insufficiently intense citation policy
Data

Social

Offer rate

h

k

Overintense

7.11

2.09

Insufficiently intense

7.61

5.63

Provider
Utility

Citation Policy
Optimal

Imposed

expected cost

expected cost

Utility

k

0.42

6.34

0.70

5.93

$2,851

0.70

13.25

0.40

11.58

$10,436

Provider’s Performance
Degree

Delta

Risk preference

sl

def

$5,000

$2,149

0.421

0.41

0.06

1.68

$5,000

-$5,436

0.855

1.71

0.13

0.56

of benevolence

For the example here, we suppose that the considered provider’s benefit (net of all other
cost) from a performed transplant is B = $5000. To calculate the optimal citation policy,
we substitute the corresponding λh , µo and h (estimated from the data), in equation 2.25
and calculate Cp∗ fp∗ . Under the assumption that the provider reacts rationally to the citation
∗
policy, the provider will try to set the optimal kt = kp|CP
, given the policy. Therefore, the

current citation policy Cp fp can be estimated from the data by substituting the probability
of failure F (ks∗ , h, t) with F (kt , h, t), the probability of failure given the used kidney quality
threshold kt in 5.
We introduce ∆ as the difference between provider’s expected cost and optimal-citation
expected cost given his decision kt .

∆ = (Cp fp − CP∗ fp∗ )F (kt , h, t)
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(2.43)

If ∆ is zero then the current Cp fp is the optimal citation policy. In other words, provider’s
perception of citation policy leads to setting his threshold kt equal to the social optimum
ks∗ . Table 2.3 presents the current and the optimal citation policy across 11 regions in the
US. We compute ∆ for every recipient across 11 regions after the implementation of CoP.
Table 2.4 represents the average ∆ of kidney transplant recipients over 11 regions. An overintense citation policy leads to positive values of ∆, and an insufficiently-intense citation
policy is associated with negative values of ∆. We assume the citation policy is sufficiently
intense if ∆ falls in the interval of (−$1000, $1000). If a provider’s ∆ > $1000 then the
provider’s response to the outcome oversight results in choosing kt > ks∗ , which leads to a
sub-optimal outcome. In this case, the social planner needs to reduce the expected cost of
unsatisfactory outcome by ∆ to avoid the negative effect of the provider’s risk-averse decision.
On the other hand, when ∆ < −$1000 provider’s decision is below the social optimum. To
address provider’s improvement shortage, the social planner’s imposed expected cost has to
be increased by ∆ by adjusting fp∗ . In our model fp represents the risk adjustment aspect
of the citation policy, while it does not depend only on donor and recipient risk factors. It
can also be risk adjusted for the availability of organ in each region.
Overall, based on our analysis, on average the citation policy has caused 17% and 41% of
recipients to receive suboptimal kidneys as a result of over-intense and insufficiently-intense
effects, respectively. The remaining 41% of recipients receive optimal kidneys given their risk
and health profiles. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the percentage of candidates that are affected
by the citation policy at each region. The overall effect of CoP is shown in Figure 2.8.
Despite increases in demand and wait time, the total saved life after 2007 reaches its highest
value at region 5 where 54,224 candidates received their kidney transplants.

2.8.4. New kidney allocation
The new allocation rules became effective on December 4, 2014. The new KAS consists
of several components. The major changes are designing new metrics to calculate and assign
new scores for the quality of donor kidney (KDPI) and recipient (EPTS), giving priority to
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Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.8.

CoP efficiency across 11 regions

Total saved life as a result of CoP implementation.
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Table 2.5. Average post-KAS outcomes for low-and high-risk recipients
Provider

Social Optimum

Wait Time

k

Utility

Cf

Expected Cost

Wait Time

k

Utility

Cf

Expected Cost

Delta

Low-risk recipients

31

0.70

15.95

$579,714

$7,682

34

0.8

16.71

$757,562

$5,000

-$2,682

High-risk recipient

267

0.54

9.62

$171,403

$4,129

62

0.391636

9.83

$120,092

$5,000

$871

sensitized candidates, pediatric priority, new waiting time calculation rules, and eventually
new kidney assignment. We focus on the new kidney assignment aspect of KAS. Based on
the new KAS, the top 20% of recovered donor kidneys (i.e., KDP I ≤ 0.2) are assigned to
the top 20% of candidates (i.e., candidates with EP T S ≤ 0.2. The remaining kidneys are
allocated among everybody. To reflect this change, we divide the recipient population into
two groups of low- and high-EPTS. we have updated the new kidney offer rate, optimal
kidney threshold, wait time and post-transplant utility based on equations 2.31 to 2.38.
The average for post-KAS results are summarized in table 2.5 for low- and high-EPTS
groups. As a result of new KAS allocation rules, the low-EPTS (i.e., low-risk) candidates
now have higher access to donor kidneys, which increases their offer rates and consequently
decreases their wait time. For the high-EPTS (high-risk) candidates, their offer rates decline
since their access to high-quality kidneys is limited which results in a wait-time increase
and at the same time their expected offered kidney quality also is reduced. If the preKAS citation policy is not adequately adjusted to these changes it will become suboptimal
under the new conditions. This is shown as the ∆ values in Table 2.5. The average of
∆ values for low-EPTS candidates is negative, while for high-EPTS we see positive values.
This indicates that the citation policy is now overintense for high-EPTS candidate, while it
became insufficiently intense for low-EPTS candidates.
Also to study the effectiveness of the new KAS, we compare the impact of KAS on
kidney transplant decision outcomes using social loss. We calculate the total social loss
across all regions and candidates before and after the KAS implementation in 2014. Our
analysis indicates that the social loss has decreased by 1,292 life years per year over the
entire population and it supports the success of KAS.
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2.8.5. The effect of risk preferences
The risk associated with organ transplant in the healthcare system can be defined in
different ways depending on the area of concern. For instance, the concern can be regarding
high waitlist mortality rates, long waiting times, unsatisfactory post-transplant outcomes,
and high kidney discard rates. Also, different parties may have different risk preferences.
In the medical literature, the standard assumption of a risk-neutral social planner is often
used. However, the center and the patient, who make the actual acceptance decision, may
have different risk preferences. For example, a patient may be more conservative to make
sure to receive a kidney in time. Our model focuses on the effect of the risk of overly
long wait times, and it is defined as the probability of patient dies on the waitlist due to
demanding a high kidney quality. Figure 2.9 represents expected wait time and utility of
the entire population (11 regions) across different risk preference levels represented by αc .
Risk neutrality is represented by αc = 0.66 since this value yields the wait time in equation
2.3 to be equal to the expected wait time. As shown in Figure 2.9, decreasing the value
of αc represents and increasing willing to risk death on the waitlist in exchange for waiting
for a higher kidney quality. On the other hand, a risk-averse decision maker (αc > 0.66)
has to wait less to receive a kidney transplant, but at the expense of accepting also lower
quality kidneys. Deviation from risk neutrality results in a reduction of expected utility. Our
empirical analysis supports the assumption of having risk neutral social planner to receive
the highest utility and find the social optimum.

2.9. Concluding remarks and future work
This study attempts to clarify the effect of performance assessment and different kidney
allocation schemes on donor kidney and patient acceptance decisions. It is difficult to perform
a direct empirical comparison for before and after the introduction of such a measure, because
many factors change from year to year. The new modeling framework to accept deceased
donor kidneys for candidates on the kidney transplant waiting list provides a tool to perform
this comparison. It also sheds light on how changes affect the acceptance of patients by
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Figure 2.9. Expected wait time and utility across different level of risk

transplant centers.
The novelty of our work is aggregating multiple stages of difficult kidney transplant
decision making from the perspective of different decision makers. We analytically inspect the
effect of performance assessment that follows the citation policy to penalize underperforming
providers on the social welfare. The efficiency and equity of the citation policy are highly
correlated with designing well-established risk-adjusted models. To improve the effectiveness
and fairness of this policy, we recognize fundamental components required to be reflected
in the risk-adjusted model. As such, we show that as the kidney allocation rule changes,
an update in the citation policy is needed to maintain its efficiency. We propose a unique
closed-form solution to accept deceased organs. Our model considers several key factors: 1)
heterogeneity for both kidney quality and candidate health, 2) organ supply, and 3) the role
of decision maker’s risk preference in accepting offered organs.
The model balances the trade-off between the benefit and the cost of kidney transplantation. The benefit is a life-year gain from receiving kidney transplantation which depends on
the quality of the accepted donor kidney. The cost includes candidate’s health deterioration
as she waits for a better offer. A socially-optimal kidney transplantation decision depends on
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candidate’s health and local donor kidney supply, which maximizes system’s welfare utility
function. The optimal citation policy needs to be designed with the goal of minimizing the
social loss resulting from the misalignment between transplant centers and social planner’s
objectives and goals.
Our empirical study presents several important insights regarding effective and efficient
kidney transplant decision and outcome oversight. First, we observe from our data that
candidate’s blood type and region influence wait time significantly. However, the quality of
accepted kidneys is almost the same among recipients with different blood types in different regions. This observation suggests that the role of the candidate’s offer rate which is
the reflection of donor kidney supply is currently neglected in making the best transplant
decision. The empirical results from our model indicates that the factors that influences
candidate’s wait time such as blood type and region supply should be considered in making the optimal kidney transplant decision. Furthermore, our empirical study reveals that
transplantation outcome assessment has been effective in providing for 42% of recipients
socially optimal transplantation decisions. However, the current regulations for evaluation
transplant center’s outcomes are risk-adjusted only based on recipient and donor risk factors.
Our model suggests that regulators might be more effective if they also take adjustment
based on organ availability for eleven regions and four different blood types into account.
This observation might reduce the tendency of risk-averse behavior among decision makers
which currently leads suboptimal results. The other advantage of supply-based adjustment
is that it can be performed under any kidney assignment rule by assessing the effects on
individual candidate’s supply or offer rate. For instance, the post-KAS benefits the top 20%
of patients by providing higher access to the kidneys whereas it has the opposite effect on
the remaining candidates. However, the regulators still apply the same evaluation metric
as before for transplant center’s outcome assessment. Not adjusting for the fact that the
new kidney assignment causes changes in individuals offer rate might motivate transplant
centers to limit access to the care for high-EPTS patients. The main reason is that highEPTS patients do not have access to high-quality kidneys, so their post-transplant outcome
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could be less desirable. If this concern is not reflected in the outcome assessment, it could
encourage transplant centers to delay transplantation for these patients leading to potentially
increased waitlist mortality, or the centers may even decide to remove enlisted high-EPTS
candidates from the waitlist.
We also show that risk neutrality is the best risk preference for the decision maker
to maximizes social welfare utility. Risk-seeking and -averse behaviors result in having
suboptimal outcomes. Our empirical study demonstrates that after CoP, 4 regions out of
11 have adjusted their risk preference class to risk neutrality. The remaining 7 regions have
become risk seeker for waiting more on the waitlist which could support the assumption of
being selective for accepting offered donor kidney as a result of oversight policy. Even though
our data analysis indicates that 58% of recipients are impacted by receiving sub-optimal
kidneys, in general, the social loss and deficiency have decreased across all 11 regions. We
also observe an increase in the degree of benevolence among 11 regions. Overall, based on
our analysis, after 2007 as a result of CoP policy the total of 34,789 life years have been
saved across all recipients who received donor kidney transplantation.
Although this research is carefully prepared, we are still aware of its shortcomings that
place restrictions on our methodology and conclusions. First of all, in our model we assume
that for each offer a new kidney quality is drawn from the kidney quality distribution. This
allows us to derive a closed for solution, but it does not represent the fact that in reality
rejected kidneys are re-offered several times, and that the kidney quality is reduced in this
time consuming process. This limitation might influence the validation of all derivations
and outcomes, if the goal of the researcher is to consider donor kidney discard rate which is
beyond the purpose of our work.
Second, to allocate available donor kidneys to eligible candidates we use random kidney
assignment in a fixed set of “active” candidates. We choose this strategy to simplify our
analysis to model kidney transplant acceptance decisions rather than modeling kidney assignment. However, this assumption does not consider the correlation between a candidate
position on the wait list and her individual donor kidney offer rate making this approach
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appropriate to reason about the complete system, but not at the level of the individual
candidate.
Third, we suppose that the decision makers are making kidney transplant decision in
response to allocation and outcome monitoring systems implemented by the social planer,
but are not affected by decisions made by competing centers or candidates. It would be
interesting to investigate the role of competition among candidates, and the effects of information sharing and disclosure of kidney acceptance thresholds with the social planer and
other decision makers.
Moreover, the impact of transplant center’s outcome and regulatory oversight can be
investigated from patient and insurer perspectives. Beside meeting regulators oversight assessment policy which may incentives transplant center to choose high quality donor kidney
and patient, they also need to compete for having a good market share. This competition among transplant centers might offset the unintended effect of regulatory oversight for
cherry-picking patients and donor kidneys.
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Chapter 3
A SIMULATION MODEL FOR DECISION MAKING AND THE IMPACT OF
INFORMATION SHARING ON ORGAN TRANSPKANTATION

3.1. Introduction
The US currently faces a national kidney shortage. Over 100,000 patients are on the
waiting list and on average over 3,000 new patients are enlisted each month. More than
4,000 patients pass away while waiting for a lifesaving kidney transplant and over 3,000
became too sick and are removed from the waitinglist. Despite this shortage, approximately
one in five kidneys recovered from deceased donors are discarded in the US [50].
To understand the reasons for such a high discard rate, it is necessary to understand the
kidney allocation and offering process. The most important criteria for kidney allocation are
(1) medical compatibility (e.g., blood and tissue type, medical needs of the patient, body
size), (2) geographical factors (distance between donor and transplant hospitals), and (3)
the position on the waitlist (e.g, waiting time, points). The offering process starts with local
patients who are medical compatible and have the highest priority on the waitlist. If local
allocation is not successful, then the organ is offered in the region (the US is divided into
11 transplantation regions) and finally nationwide. The reason for prioritizing local patients
in the kidney assignment process is to reduce the time between harvesting the organ and
the implantation. This time is called Cold Ischema Time (CIT) and plays an essential role
in kidney functioning after transplantation. Figure 3.1 represents the average CIT and wait
time in US.
When CIT reaches 24 hours, it is typically hard to find a patient to accept the offer.
Normally, after 48 hours passed by, all kidneys that failed to be accepted will be discarded
[99]. As indicated in [41], the regional variations in kidney outcomes have been observed
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Figure 3.1.

Average wait time and cold ischemia time across 11 regions in US (2015).

and those regions with longer CIT are more likely to also have lower post-transplant kidney
survival rates. This results in the suggestion that reducing kidney CIT through managerial
improvements could be a cost-effective way to improve the current transplantation system.
Transplant surgeons and regulators have expressed their concerns regarding high observed
kidney discard rates in the US. The most common reason for donor kidney refusal is the
heterogeneity of donor kidneys concerning their quality. Data shows that transplant surgeons
would rather reject low-quality kidneys for a relatively healthy patient in the hope of receiving
a better offer in the future [36]. Marginal kidneys are believed to be still beneficial and
transplantable for certain patients. However, allocation and transplantation has to be done
in a timely manner so the kidney does not deteriorate and become unusable. Efficiently
allocating marginal kidneys may help in reducing kidney discard rates.
In addition to the kidney quality, kidney acceptance and discard may also be affected by
the allocation process itself [42]. There are several evidence that kidneys rejected early on in
the allocation process are less likely to be accepted later on. Even almost identical kidneys
from the same donor may receive different attention. For instance, it has happened that
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one kidney of a pair is accepted early on in the allocation process, whereas the other one
accumulates a very long CIT or even gets discarded. It seems like early rejection of donor
kidneys by surgeons may effectively influence subsequent decisions by other surgeons [107].
Another concern is increasing risk aversion of transplantation centers due to ProgramSpecific Reports that evaluate post-transplant outcomes. These may provide incentives
for the centers to demand higher-quality kidneys. Consequently, they might turn down
kidneys that pose a risk of negatively impacting the evaluation of their post-transplant
outcomes [12, 29, 42, 74–76, 88].
Patients may react to long wait times in their home region by either changing their
acceptance strategy or by trying to improve their chances to receive a transplantation earlier
by moving to a region with shorter wait times or by enlisting in multiple transplant centers
[18]. Multiple listing involves registering more than one transplant centers. With the goal
of receiving faster kidney transplants, patients would consider multiple enlisting at different
regions rather than the same region due to kidney allocation distance priority rules. More
than 4% of the patient waiting for kidney transplant are multiple listed which is the highest
rate among all organs [9].
As with any transplant enlisting, the patient must complete evaluation tests and be
committed to transplant center’s regulation, such as ability to arrive to the transplant center
within a certain time limit to be admitted by the center. This process can be quiet costly,
since most insurance companies may not reimburse the cost of additional evaluations [88,89].
It is also important for a patient to learn if post-transplant care can be transferred to a center
closer to her residence.
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) is in charge of of kidney
assignment in the US. To address the high kidney discard rate (about 20%) in the US, OPTN
has recently made major changes to modify the kidney assignment rules, by introducing a
new Kidney Allocation System (KAS) [53]. OPTN has also modified the assessment metrics
of transplant centers by using a Bayesian approach as opposed to frequents metrics used
before [39, 70].
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Figure 3.2.
Waitlisted patient, kidney transplant and waitlist removal rates across 11
regions in US (2015).

In this chapter, we introduce a flexible simulation model that can be used to analyze the
effect of changes to the kidney allocation system and the offering process. The simulation
model takes into account patient’s health, donor-kidney quality deterioration during the
allocation process, and also supply and demand. Furthermore, the model considers the
chance that a matching kidney cannot be accepted because of other reasons (e.g., shortterm sickness of the patient, insufficient surgical resources, etc.), as well as the impact of
information sharing on the efficiency of the offering process.
Using parameters estimated from data provided by United Network of Organ Sharing
(UNOS) and SRTR, we apply the simulation model to investigate two important trends in
kidney transplantation.
(1) Multiple-listing: Transferring to a region with shorter wait time or waitlisting in
multiple regions can help a patient by increasing her chance to receive a kidney transplant
earlier. Consequently, the patient can improve post-transplant outcome due to less health
deterioration of staying on dialysis. However, it is not easy to develop a strategy to guide
the patient’s decision for transferring or multi-listing. We formulate the decision as a utility
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maximization problem under a set of budget, distance and facility constraints at the regional
level. Supply and demand vary widely across the 11 regions in the US and for different blood
types which results in widely varying wait times which should also lead to different expected
utilities and different optimal kidney acceptance strategies expressed in the optimal kidney
quality thresholds. To derive patient’s utility for different regions, we use the simulation
model to obtain utility under individualized optimal kidney transplant acceptance decisions
based on patient’s health status, and supply and demand for patient’s blood type in different
regions. We use the obtained information to solve the optimization problem and derive an
optimal regions selection policy.
(2) Information technology: Rapid and precise communication between UNOS and
transplant centers is necessary to make the process of organ allocation more efficient. This
even becomes more important in the face of multi-listed patients. UNOS has the goal to
increase the use of information technology in the process of organ allocation and transplantation. They have implemented a secure online-based system that collects data to enhance the
capability of the transplant system and not reduces patient’s chance of receiving a life-saving
organ. As technology has evolved, UNOS also encourages for developing and using newer
technology such as mobile devices for faster and efficient consideration of donor kidney offers
that may results in higher kidney utilization rate [90]. Mobile devices will make it easier to
collect availability of patients for transplantation (e.g., via an app). Using this information,
the OPTN would be able to allocate the kidney faster, reducing kidney deterioration and
discard. In the ideal case of perfect information, OPTN could find the first patient on the
waitlist who will accept the kidney instantly which would reduce discard to a minimum. The
simulation will evaluate the effect of a realistic case of limited information sharing.

3.2. Literature Review
In this section, we review studies relevant to this chapter. Most literatures fall within
one or both of two streams of research concerned with decision-making for accepting kidneys
and designing the allocation process.
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Focusing on decision-making, Ahn et al. [7] develop a theoretical model that considers
patient health in making an acceptance/rejection decision concerning the quality of offered
kidney. Their analysis reveals that a relatively-healthy patient can afford to be selective
about the quality of donor kidneys and so expect to receive a better post-transplant outcome
by accepting a high-quality kidney.
Howard et al. [36] apply the optimal stopping problem to model organ acceptance decisions by patients. He proposes a model in which a transplant surgeon is in charge of accepting
or rejecting an offered liver to the patient. He concludes that the surgeon desires to reject
low-quality livers for a relatively-healthy patient in the hope of receiving better offers in the
future.
Alagoz et al. [8] consider the optimal time of accepting living-donor transplantation.
They formulate their problem using a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to maximize patient’s
total reward. Their computational experiment confirms that the optimal policy is usually of
control-limit type.
To analyze the allocation process, Zenios et al. [106] proposes a dynamic resource allocation that maximizes patient’s life expectancy from receiving a kidney transplant while minimizing the inequity. They construct a simulation model that shows the currently-employed
organ allocation policy, boosts patient quality-adjusted life expectancy, and reduces the expected waiting time.
Su et al. [81] introduce a queuing model that study the effect of patient choice on organ
allocation system analyzing the kidney rejection rate. They also evaluate the performance of
the waiting system under both FCFS and LCFS policies. Their finding of analyzing these two
extremes conclude that LCFS is efficient in opposed to FCFS. In fact, in contrast to LCFS,
the FCFS settings desensitize patients to refuse low-quality kidney, so they subsequently
observe low kidney utilization. On the other hand, they show that the LCFS policy obtains
optimal organ utilization.
Su et al. [82] investigate the role of patient choice in kidney allocation. By using a
sequential stochastic assignment model, they address the conflict between the patient choice
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and the social welfare. Their analysis considers two schemes. The first scheme develops
under the assumption that patients will accept all kidneys offered. The first-best solution is
to find an allocation policy that maximizes the social welfare. By introducing patient choice,
they modify the first-best policy to achieve a second-best policy. As a result, they introduce
an incentive compatibility condition, which forces the allocation policy to be designed in
such a way that it assures that patients will accept all kidney offers.
Su et al. [83] introduce a mechanism design model that takes patient choice into account
in the organ allocation system. Patients state the types of kidney they desire to receive
upon joining the kidney transplant waiting list (not at the time of donor kidney offer) and
join the queue that serves the declared kidney type. That way, the model reduces the long
searching process, by identifying appropriate patients who desire to accept retrieved donor
kidneys more effectively.
Bertsimas et al. [14] study geographical disparities in access to deceased donor kidneys.
They use a fluid approximation to formulate the optimal way a patient can be enlisted in
the waiting lists of multiple transplant centers. Patient’s perspective is to maximize life
expectancy while minimizing the congestion cost. By combining analytical, simulation and
numerical results, they show that multiple listing greatly promotes geographical equity and
increases the donor kidney supply. Having more donors lead to a higher transplant rate and
lesses the patient mortality rate on the kidney transplant waiting list.
As Koizumi et al. [41] report, regional variations in kidney outcomes have been observed,
but the main reason behind it is unknown. Their findings revels Significant CIT variations
across regions for both donor kidney and liver. Specifically, they find regions that have longer
CIT are more likely to have a lower post transplant kidney survival rate. They suggest
managerial improvements can be a cost-effective choice to enhance the current transplant
system performance and potentiality reduces kidney discard rates.
Similar to this work, Ruth et al. [67] propose a simulation model for the organ allocation
process. Their model assess the effect of changes in diseased donor kidneys on the waiting
list. They found that under the organ allocation conditions in 1985, the length of waiting list
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would continue to grow. The simulation focuses on waitlist length, while the simulation in
this paper gives a more complete picture by also considering the effect of the patient decision
rule and incorporating expected post-transplant utility.

3.3. Model description
We model the waitlist as a queue with patients joining when they enroll in a transplantation center and leaving when they accept an offered kidney or when they get too sick
for transplantation. In the following we discuss the components of the simulation model
including patients, kidneys, the allocation process, and post-transplant utility as shown in
Figure 3.3.

3.3.1. Patients
We assume that patients can be split into several groups of competitive patients who
can receive the same type of donor organ depending on blood type, HLA match, and other
criteria. We will model each group separately and if there is interaction between groups
(e.g., some patients with blood type AB may receive organs from donors with any blood
type), then we will consider it by adjusting supply to the individual groups.
Each competitive patient group is modeled by a queue. While any process can be used,
we assume here a Poisson process with the arrival rate of λ. Patients are assumed to join with
a health status h0 representing the remaining time they can survive on dialysis when they
join. We model the distribution of h0 in the patient population using a Weibull distribution,
often used in survival analysis to represent time-to-failure since it is able to express failure
rates that are decreasing, constant, or increasing over time. The health for a random patient
can be seen as a realization of a random variable H ∼ Weibull(a, b), where a and b are the
scale and shape parameters, respectively.
Patients depart from the waitlist if (1) they receive a transplant or (2) they leave the
queue due to insufficient health. Since h0 is the time the patient can survive on dialysis when
she joins the waitlist (i.e., waited so far zero years), the actual health after waiting w years
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Figure 3.3.

The simulation model for the kidney allocation and acceptance process.

is hw = h0 − w which means the patient will leave the waitlist at the latest when w = h0 .
3.3.2. Kidneys
The kidney arrival process can follow any process and we use a Poisson process with
arrival rate µ. OPTN defined the Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI) which represents a
quality metric of the kidney that incorporates ten clinical donor factors to estimate how long a
kidney is expected to function [57]. By construction, KDPI is close to uniformly distributed
over all kidneys harvested in a given year. Following KDPI, we model the quality of an
arriving donor kidney shown with q0 as the realization of a random variable Q ∼ Unif(0, 1).
Here we use 0 to represent the worst kidney quality and 1 as the best.
For the case of donor kidney shortage we have µ < λ. The queue still will only grow to a
finite size, since a larger waitlist results in longer wait times which in turn will increase the
rate of patients leaving because they are not healthy enough to receive a transplant.

3.3.3. Kidney allocation and acceptance
In the basic allocation system, when a new donor kidney becomes available, its quality
q0 is assessed and the kidney is simultaneously offered to a group of g patients with a given
window to decide. OPTN currently uses a group size of five and a time window of one hour.
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At the time of offer, the kidney has accumulated CIT t and the quality is reduced to qt .
We model the decision by the patient and surgeon using a threshold strategy governed by
rejecting the offer if qt < k, where k is the set threshold. In case that the kidney meets
the quality threshold (i.e, qt ≥ k), the offer will only be accepted with probability p(trans).
This probability represents the fact that the patient or the surgeon may decide against the
kidney for reasons not explained by purely kidney quality. Examples are that the patient is
currently not available or that resources needed for the surgery cannot be provided in time.
If nobody in the group of g patients is able to accept the kidney after the alloted time, then
the kidney is offered to the next group of g patients on the waitlist. Over time, the kidney
deteriorates. We model this deterioration as qt = q0 (1 − δ)t , where δ is a deterioration factor
and t is the accumulated CIT in hours. For convenience, we measure time here as multiples
of the time allowed for one round of offering. If the patients have one hour to decide, then
t represents accumulated CIT in hours. When qt becomes zero, then the kidney needs to be
discarded.
Patients choose their decision threshold k. The threshold is influenced by the patient’s
health h0 , since a patient who has more time left on dialysis will be able to wait for a
better quality kidney. We model this relationship by choosing k for each patient from a
random variable K ∼ Unif(0,1) which is correlated to the patient’s h0 with Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient ρH,K .
3.3.4. Patient’s post-transplant utility
A patient’s post-transplant utility depends on the quality of the transplanted kidney qt ,
patient’s health when she joins the wait list h0 , and the remaining time she waits for the
transplant since she receives the first offer w . We use

U (qt , h0 , w) = B(h0 , qt ) D(h0 , w),

(3.1)

where B(h0 , qt ) is the patients utility if she receives a kidney with quality qt right after she
joins the waitlist without waiting. D(·) represents a cost in the form of degradation factor
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due to waiting w for the kidney. B(·) can be defined in the form of a logistic regression for
survival proposed by Cox [65]. which models the conditional odds of dying at any time point
given survival up to that point.

B(h0 , qt ) =

m(h0 )
,
1 + exp(−β(qt − α))

(3.2)

where m(h0 ) indicates the transplant outcome for a patient with health level h0 who received
a perfect kidney (qt = 1) right after her first offer (w = 0). Natural, m(h0 ) is increasing with
h0 . The benefit function therefore increases with patient’s health h0 and also kidney quality
q0 , since

∂B(h0 ,qt )
∂qt

> 0.

For patient’s health deterioration factor we use

γ
w
D(h0 , w) = 1 −
.
h0

(3.3)

The deterioration factor in Equation 3.3 equals one when the wait time is zero (w = 0).
On the other hand, if the patient decides to wait for a very high-quality kidney, she cannot
survive longer than w = h0 . In that case, equation 3.3 becomes zero. In equation 3.3,
γ controls the rate of deterioration. For γ = 1 the deterioration is linear, γ > 1 results
in initially faster deterioration and for γ < 1 the deterioration is initially slower and then
speeds up.

3.4. Applications and numerical results
We present three applications of the simulation model in this section. The first two
application considers decisions at the patient level. If we assume that the patient wants to
maximize the expected patient’s post-transplant utility, then we can use simulation to find
the optimal threshold, k ∗ for a patient with a given current position on the waitlist, a current
health, and who is listed in a given region.
The second application provides a strategic guideline to support a patients choice for
changing regions or enlisting in multiple regions. According to the [54], the patient can move
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to a different region or apply for being enlisted in more than one center while preserving
her current position in the national waiting list provided that she meets certain OPTN
conditions. For an individual patient, we present an optimal region selection policy based on
patient’s constraints over 11 US regions. The model can also be easily extended to inform
optimal selection policy at the level of local Organ Procurement Organization (OPOs) or
even transplant centers.
The third application of our simulation model is practical for an organ allocation agency
to efficiently identify patients to whom a donor kidney can be offered using up-to-date information shared via app technology. The goal is to improve social welfare through increasing
patient’s post-transplant utility and kidney utilization rate. First we discuss how the simulation model parameters are estimated.

3.4.1. Parameter estimation
We use data from UNOS and SRTR to estimate model parameters. The UNOS dataset
is publicly available through its website [91]. We extract UNOS data for the year 2015 to
estimate the waitlist additions and donor kidney supply. For kidney quality (KDPI) and wait
time calculation, we use values reported by SRTR. The SRTR data system contains detailed
medical and demographic data for all donors, waitlisted patients and transplant recipients
in the United States, between October 1987 and the end of 2016. The used dataset consists
of 395,950 patients who are first-time recipients of deceased donor kidney transplants.
In this chapter we report results for blood type A, but results for other blood types can
be obtained in a similar fashion. The annual reports data from UNOS provides waiting list
addition and removal statistics based on different factors such as patients’ blood types and
regions. We use this data to estimate patients’ arrival rate λ to the waiting list in each
period. To estimate kidney arrival rate µ, we use the donor kidney report of UNOS and the
clinical data of SRTR. Table 3.1 shows donors and patient arrivals relevant for blood type A.
Since patients with blood type A can receive organs from donors with blood type O, these
are also included in the table. Based on SRTR data, patients with blood type A receive 94%
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Region

Donors O

Donors A

µ

λ

1

143

118

228

537

2

473

387

746

1769

3

625

461

892

1680

4

421

303

587

1154

5

636

452

875

1910

6

165

132

265

377

7

300

239

461

1008

8

296

226

436

688

9

146

114

220

735

10

349

284

548

1040

11

423

304

588

1080

Table 3.1. Estimation of annual kidney supply µ and patient arrival rates λ for patients
with blood type A over the 11 US regions (2015).

of the organs from donors with blood type A and an additional 2% of the organs from donors
of blood type O. This is reflected in the kidney supply µ. We perform the simulation using
the information in Table 3.1 for the estimation of kidney supply and patient arrivals across
11 regions. Note that the supplies presented in Table 3.1 ignore that kidneys can be shared
between regions. This simplification can be justified by the fact that high-quality kidneys
recovered in any region have a high chance to be accepted locally, while low-quality kidneys
are offered regionally first and the are offered nationwide already with a relatively high CIT,
reducing their impact on the overall system utility.
Following the current offering scheme, we use the patient group size g = 5. We set the
kidney degradation rate δ to 5%. This reflects reports that organs are rarely used after a CIT
of 48 hours [41]. At δ = 0.05 the quality of the kidney has deteriorated to (1−0.05)48 = 8.5%
of its initial quality.
In our work, we set the transplantation probability to p(trans) = 0.8 for the simulations.
However, the probability may differ between regions and a estimate could be obtained from
offer data.
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For m(h0 ), the health outcome of a patient with h0 receiving a perfect kidney we use a
simple linear function m(h0 ) = θh0 . For the simulations we use θ = 5.
The parameters α, β and γ for the benefit function B(h0 , qt ) and the cost factor C(h0 , w)
can be estimated if outcome data including realized post-transplant survival is available.
However, since this data was not available in the obtained data, we use for the simulation
α = 0.4, β = 8 and γ = 0.5.
We add patients to the wait list with a health h0 drawn from a random variable H with
a Weibull distribution. We use a scale parameter a = 8 and a shape parameter b = 2 to
get an average health of close to 7 years and around 90% of the population below 12 years.
We use a Spearman’s rank correlation ρ(H,K) of 0.2 which is close to the correlation between
accepted kidney quality and patient health observed in the data.

3.4.2. Regions selection and multiple-listing
To assist the patient to identify a region to transfer to or with identifying a set of
regions for multiple-enlisting, we present a simple, yet informative optimization model that
maximizes patient’s post-transplant expected utility given constraints on distance D, budget
C, and performance P . To formulate our multiple-listing problem, we define the binary
variable ri which is equal to one if region i ∈ I = {1, 2, .., 11} is selected and 0 otherwise.
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max

X

Ui (ki∗ )ri

i∈I

s.t.
X

ci ri ≤ C

i∈I

X

di ri ≤ D

(3.4)

i∈I

X

pi ri ≥ P

i∈I

X

ri = 1

i∈I

ri = 0 or

1

The first constraint makes sure that the solution satisfies the total budget C of individual
patient on the evaluation, traveling and loading expenses. The second constraint considers
the maximum distance D the patient desires to travel. The third constraints consider patient’s expectation from region’s performance P and finally the last constraint restricts the
model to select only one region. We execute the optimization iteratively. At each run,
the model finds the region that maximizes patient’s expected post-transplant utility under the given constraints represented as the only 1 entry in the decision vector r. After
each optimization run, we remove the selected region and update the remaining budget as
P
C = C − i∈I ci ri∗ to find the next region. The model returns no region when it fails to find
any region that satisfies the patient’s constraints. The generated optimal solution at each
run forms a list that provides multiple-listing options to the patient in a descending order
of post-transplant expected utility.
The objective function uses the maximum utility that a given patient can obtain by receiving transplant in different regions. These utilities can be obtained through the simulation
model. The simulation model is run for each region to find the the optimal kidney quality
threshold that maximizes the patient’s post-transplant utility. Without loss of generality we
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perform the simulation for a target patient with blood type A with a remaining one life-year
on dialysis h0 = 1. We fill the waitlist with randomly generated patients and place the target
patient at position j = 100 in the wait list. We perform the same simulation 100 times each
for the decision threshold values k ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 0.9} and average the results of the 100
runs.
In Table 3.2 we report the results for the best k resulting in the largest average utility
for each region. Note that the reported wait time (in years) is very short, since it only
includes the time from when the patient already reached position j = 100 in the wait list.
For instance, if the target patient is enrolled in region 6 a threshold of k = 0.65 is optimal
which leads to a utility of 9.6 years, whereas if she is enlisted in region 2 the optimal decision
can be as high as 0.85 with a utility of 13.22 years.

3.4.3. Information sharing to improve allocation efficiency
Information sharing, where the transplantation center and the patient share up-to-date
information with OPTN, has the potential to speed up the kidney allocation process and
thus reduce cold ischemia time (CIT). The following information can be shared:
1. Patient’s acceptance threshold k: Each patient reports their kidney quality acceptance
threshold k decided by herself and her physician.
2. Patient’s additional decision criteria: Patient’s and surgeon’s decision can be affected
by information not included in the kidney quality assessment (KDPI). Having more
standardized quality parameters, where the patient can prespecify what she accepts,
would improve kidney allocation. Under complete information, OPTN would able to
instantly identify the patients who would accept the kidney.
3. Patient’s current availability: An up-to-date indication if the patient can currently
receive a transplantation. Factors include current health and traveling.
4. Transplant center’s availability: Considers the availability of transplant center’s facility
such as preprepared operation rooms, free surgeons, nurses and staffs for performing
the surgery in time.
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Region

µ

k∗

qt

w

U

nreject

1

228

0.60

0.76

0.53

9.11

17

2

746

0.85

0.95

0.20

13.22

27

3

892

0.85

0.93

0.16

13.55

24

4

588

0.80

0.90

0.25

12.81

24

5

875

0.85

0.92

0.16

13.50

24

6

255

0.65

0.76

0.49

9.65

19

7

461

0.75

0.80

0.31

12.00

21

8

436

0.75

0.84

0.34

11.90

21

9

220

0.60

0.67

0.57

8.87

17

10

548

0.80

0.92

0.26 12.70

25

11

588

0.80

0.92

0.24 12.84

24

Table 3.2. Optimal post-transplant utility U under the optimal decision threshold in different
regions for a patient in waitlist position 100.

The first information is used in the acceptance decision where the patient requires qt ≥ k
before considering the organ. Perfect information, where OPTN knows all patients threshold,
can speed up donor kidney assignment, by only offering the kidney to patients with k ≤
qt . The lack of complete information for 2–4 is reflected in the simulation model by the
transplantation probability

p(trans) = p(accept) p(patient) p(center),
where the three probabilities represent three independent events which have to occur for the
transplantation to be performed. Under perfect information, OPTN knows at any time for
all patients acceptance thresholds k, any additional requirement for the organ and if the
patient and center are available. Therefore, OPTN can directly identify the first patient
on the waitlist who will receive the transplant. This will effectively reduce CIT t to the
minimum needed to extract the organ and perform the transplantation. This can be equivalently expressed by setting group size g to infinity indicating that we can go through the
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whole waitlist instantly. In a more realistic setting with some potentially imperfect information sharing, patients can be identified faster using the shared information expressed by an
increased groups size that can be processed per hour.
We report in the following the results for patients of blood type A in region 6. We
initialize the waiting list with 1000 patients and run it till the waitlist length stabilizes at
around 1800 patients (200 month). We report results after this warm-up period averaged
over 300 month. We vary the group size to g to represent varying levels of information
sharing. The baseline is the currently used group size of g = 5.
Table 3.3 shows the impact of information sharing expressed in the form of group size,
which reflects how many patients on the waitlist can effectively be considered per hour. At
the baseline group size of five, the average quality of accepted kidney is 0.66 which leads to
receiving the average utility of 10.76 years per transplanted patient. The kidney can travel
as far as 45 patients on the waitlist and is accepted on average by the 6th patient who waited
3.84 years. Table 3.4 presents kidney utilization and waitlist mortality rate in addition to
the transplant rate. The kidney utilization rate increases significantly as the group size of
patients expands. As Figure 3.4 demonstrates, the minimum improvement in the kidney
transplant rate is 17% which can be obtained by slightly expanding patient’s search group
size, and it reaches to 47% when the use of information is perfect. On the other hand, the
waitlist mortality rate decreases by 7% when the group size is 10, and the reduction can be
as high as 21%.

3.5. Concluding remarks
The first contribution of this research is a simulation model developed to provide an optimal deceased donor kidney acceptance guidance for the decision makers. The major challenge
of modeling organ acceptance/rejection problem is incorporating real-world conditions and
situations associated with making an important life-saving decision. For this reason, our
primary intension as the main novelty of this work is to recognize, aggregate, and implement
all essential elements that contribute to kidney selection criteria. The proposed model allows
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Group Waitlist position Waitlist position Average

Average

Average

patient

wait time

utility (year)

(year)

size g

(mean)

(max)

q

5

6.00

45

0.66

11.03

3.84

10

8.00

80

0.62

10.99

3.59

20

10.00

119

0.60

10.9

3.39

100

22.00

344

0.57

10.82

3.07

∞

58.00

1383

0.55

10.80

3.00

Table 3.3. The effect of information sharing on patient post transplant expected utility
based on region 6 kidneys supply and demand

Kidney

Kidney

Waitlist

Kidney

utilization

discard

removal

transplant

rate

rate

rate

rate

5

85.0%

15.0%

8.9%

17%

10

90.9%

9.1%

8.3%

20%

20

94.3%

5.7%

7.9%

21.5%

100

98.5%

1.5%

7.3%

23.8%

∞

99.98%

0.02%

7.1%

25.2%

Group
size g

Table 3.4. Kidney utilization, waitlist, and mortality rates in region 6.
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Figure 3.4.

Kidney transplant and waitlist mortality rates improvement.

for diversity in patients’ health and kidney’s quality as well as their correlation. Moreover,
we include the quality deterioration of kidneys caused by accumulating CIT as they navigate down the waiting list to find a recipient. In addition to all aforementioned elements,
we also monitor patients’ health and availability together with human and facility resources
to propose an optimal transplant solution. Our model also informs multiple-enlisting policy
to patient. It offers a set of regions for patient for being enlisted given distance, cost and
transplant volume constraints.
The second application of our simulation model proposed in this work draws attention
to the social welfare aspect of kidney transplantation rather than focusing on finding an
optimal solution as considered in the first model. We compare the social welfare results (i.e.
donor kidney utilization and post transplant utility) in the presence and absence of perfect
information submitted by the decision makers to the organ allocation policy maker. The
perfect information is a reflection of patient’s willingness and transplant hospital’s readiness
for performing a transplantation surgery. Collecting and sharing precise and timely data can
provide a solid and valuable information to the policy makers. The valid and up to date
data can be helpful to allocate retrieved organs more efficiently.
Beside the current regulations and rules for donor kidney assignment, the usage of tech-
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nology in medicine would be a superior help. Designing an organ transplantation application
for a smartphone device can provide a safe, easy and fast way to submit and update the
required information in a timely fashion. The policymaker may wish to establish a ground
rule that all patients and transplant centers need to follow to be considered for receiving
offer. For instance, using a mandatory app technology and service, transplant centers can
revise or verify their submitted data in a timely base (i.e. every day) after patient’s position
on the wait list passes a certain threshold. The application may also provide a unique environment based on this data and other assignment policy to rank and find patients in less
time. By using this technology, they might expand the group size of patients that simultaneously receive kidney offers to a large number. Subsequently, less time would be devoted
to the transplant team for accepting or refusing an offer.
Deceased donor kidneys are an scarce organ resource and making a prompt decision
can preserve their qualities for a long time. Accordingly, the kidneys can be offered to
more patients which results in alleviating kidney utilization and declining kidney discard
rate. Increasing the transplant rate improves social welfare utility and reduces the length of
kidney transplant waiting list, time and mortality rate.
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Chapter 4
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTIBODY-BASED INDUCTION THERAPY IN
DECEASED DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION IN THE UNITED STATES

This chapter is the result of collaborative research with Mehmet Ayvaci, Michael Hahsler,
Tracy Giacoma, Robert S. Gaston, and Bekir Tanriover and was published in [26].

4.1. Introduction
For most patients in the United States with end stage renal disease (ESRD), transplantation is the preferred modality of treatment, as it not only improves survival and quality
of life, but is also more cost-effective than dialysis [21, 25, 105]. In 2010, kidney transplant
care, delivered to 30% of the overall ESRD population, accounted for only 10% (approximately $2.8 billion) of total Medicare ESRD expenditures [85, 94]. Long-term successful
engraftment necessitates use of immunosuppressant drug therapy to prevent immunologic
rejection and maintain allograft function. How best to initiate effective immunosuppression
at the time of transplantation remains controversial, with some preferring perioperative administration of potent biologic agents to enhance immediate efficacy, and others targeting
early attainment of therapeutic levels of maintenance agents (no-induction). Beyond these
broader approaches, many choose antibody-based induction only in selected patients, perhaps when delayed allograft function is anticipated or in high immunologic risk recipients [28].
Contemporary options include both lymphocyte-depleting antibodies (polyclonal rabbit antithymocyte globulin [r-ATG] and monoclonal humanized anti-CD52 antibody [alemtuzumab])
and non-depleting monoclonal antibodies (interleukin 2 receptor antagonists [IL2-RA], such
as basiliximab) [33, 86]. Based on perceptions of efficacy, lymphocyte-depletion is now the
favored approach in the U.S. (57% of recipients in 2011), though the Kidney Disease Improving Global Outcomes (KDIGO) guidelines recommend IL2-RA as first line induction in
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all types of donor-recipient profiles [28, 46].
Beyond issues surrounding efficacy of individual agents across a wide range of risk factors, antibody-based induction therapy adds cost to the care of kidney transplant recipients, a consideration only rarely included in decision-making regarding its use. Since renal
transplantation is largely financed through public funds in the U.S. (Medicare), I sought
to define, from the payers perspective, the incremental cost effectiveness among different
agents/approaches to early immunosuppressive treatment in risk-stratified DDRT recipients:
no-induction, IL2-RA, r-ATG, and alemtuzumab.

4.2. Material & methods

4.2.1. Design and study cohort
The United States Renal Data System (USRDS) collaborates with the ESRD networks
and the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), and incorporates Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS)s billing (including ICD-9-CM diagnosis and procedure coding,
CMS revenue center codes, HCPCS procedure codes, all eligible claims and payments) records
into the USRDS database. This combined database allows researchers to analyze characteristics and outcomes of ESRD and renal transplant recipients and related cost for the medical
services provided to them. Medicare is the primary payer for more than 70% of the recipients
and secondary payer for all others [85, 101]. Medicare coverage lasts only three-years except
for those patients older than 65 years or non-ESRD related disabilities [85].
This study is a retrospective cohort analysis of the USRDS database that initially included all adults who listed and underwent DDKT between January 1, 2000 and September
30, 2008 (N=66,204). Exclusion criteria consisted of patients: (1) undergoing multiorgan
transplants; (2) undergoing repeat kidney transplantations; (3) receiving multiple induction
agents and other research induction drugs; (4) for whom Medicare was not primary payer (or
the Medicare payment for the initial transplant hospitalization less than $15,000). A total
of 19,450 patients were included in the final analysis. The study population was initially
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divided into two risk groups (low vs. high) based on donor and recipient risk factors for
overall graft failure including death with function. The high-risk group is defined as having
any of the following: panel reactive antibody (PRA) > 20%, African American [AA] race,
cold ischemia time [CIT] > 24 hours (higher risk for delayed allograft function), recipients
age > 60 (higher risk for death with functioning graft), kidney donor risk profile [KDPI]
50-100% (mainly representing the range for expanded criteria donor kidneys in old allocation system prior to December 4, 2014) [15, 16, 27, 33, 62, 101]. Each risk group was further
stratified based on induction categories including no-induction, alemtuzumab, r-ATG, and
IL2-RA.
These research activities are consistent with the Principles of the Declaration of Istanbul
on Organ Trafficking, and were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Columbia
University College of Physicians and Surgeons.

4.2.2. Cost estimations
Programming experts in the Pharmaceutical Research Computing at School of Pharmacy,
University of Maryland, constructed the cost files. A study index date (date of transplant)
was identified for each individual. All Medicare payments on a per patient basis were summarized as monthly (person 30-day period files) reimbursements (the amount paid for physician/supplier and institutional claims) during the first 36-months following transplantation,
with the index date as reference. The aggregate of average monthly reimbursements were
then summed to obtain total cumulative cost for each of the induction categories (including
reimbursement for transplant and subsequent hospitalizations, infection, rejection and return to dialysis). Reimbursement for induction treatment is bundled in the initial transplant
hospitalization payment by Medicare. A three-percent inflation factor was used to adjust
Medicare payments to 2013 U.S. dollar value. Additionally, Medicare reimburses organ acquisition cost to transplant centers (including the kidney recovery surgery and other related
costs, such as tissue typing, candidacy evaluation services, registration fees, and preservation
- perfusion costs). Since Medicare data does not include kidney acquisition cost, I added
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estimated $30,000 per kidneys with KDPI < 50% and $35,000 per kidney with KDPI > 50%
(relatively marginal organs) as a cost of organ recovery (charges of the Organ Procurement
Organization to the transplant center) [101].

4.2.3. Effect estimations
Effect was defined as number of the months of functioning allograft within 36 months
post-transplantation period. Censoring occurred on return to dialysis, re-transplant, death,
or end of the study period.

4.2.4. Main outcomes
The primary outcomes were cumulative cost (C), effect (E), and incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio (ICER) within three-years of transplantation among induction categories under two-risk
groups. Based on my choice of health outcome, ICER value represents the incremental cost
per additional year of graft survival over three years for the alternative immunosuppression
treatment as compared to the base treatment or no treatment at all.

4.2.5. Statistical and cost-effectiveness analysis
Donor and recipient characteristics were described using frequencies or means standard
deviation. Comparison between groups was made using the t test, Kruskal-Wallis test, or
chi-squared test. Graft survival rates were estimated using the Kaplan-Meier product limit
method. The log-rank test was used for comparison of the unadjusted survival curves. P
values < 0.05 were considered statistically significant. Statistical analyses were performed
with Stata 14 MP4 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX).
I used non-parametric bootstrapping method to estimate the expected values of cost and
effect parameters for both low and high-risk recipient groups. Non-parametric bootstrapping
is the primary choice for conducting cost-effectiveness when the theoretical distribution to be
used for statistical inference is unknown. It yields estimate of error and confidence intervals
by random sampling with replacement from the original cohort [78]. I used absolute and
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extended dominance for an initial assessment of cost-effectiveness of induction choices. The
absolute dominance occurs ewhen a strategy is less costly and more effective than at least
one alternative. The extended dominance is the case when the dominated strategy is less
effective and less costly than any point located on the line of linear combination of two other
strategies. When a treatment is dominated, it is eliminated from risk group. I then use
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) to compare cost-effectiveness of among final two
induction choices within each risk group. To assess the comparative cost-effectiveness of two
induction groups, say A and B, I determine the ICER values using the following equation:

ICER =

Total cost with induction A − Total cost of induction B
Effectiveness with induction A − Effectiveness with induction B

(4.1)

where total cost or effectiveness of an induction group refers to the mean total cost or mean
effectiveness of the bootstrap sample, respectively. ICER value indicates the amount of cost
I would like to spend for each extra unit of effectiveness to achieve a more effective treatment.
I then performed 1,000 replications to obtain randomly distributed ICER values. I converted
the effects from months to years and assumed the baseline of willingness-to-pay to be $50,000.
Using the independent bootstrap samples, I plotted the cost-effectiveness acceptability curves
(CEAC) for both low and high-risk groups. CEAC shows the probability that a decided
option was cost-effective for a given willingness-to pay threshold. The shape of the CEAC
provides the joint uncertainty in costs and effects [34]. The World Health Organization
recommends that ICER less than a countrys gross domestic product per capita (GDP per
capita: $52,980 in the U.S. in 2013) is considered very cost-effective, those with an ICER
between one to three times GDP can be considered cost-effective ($52,980 to $158,940 for the
U.S. in 2013), and any ICER three times or higher should not be considered cost-effective
(> $158, 940 for the U.S. in 2013) [13]. Different willingness-to-pay thresholds ($100,000
and $150,000) were used to explore whether any selected induction category remains cost
effective at the respective threshold.
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4.3. Results

4.3.1. Patient characteristics and outcomes

Figure 4.1. Induction types between 2000 and 2008 in our cohort of DDKT recipients.

Frequencies of Induction categories among DDRT recipients between 2000 and 2008
are shown in Figure 4.1. Use of lymphocyte-depleting induction agents (r-ATG and alemtuzumab) increased during this interval, while IL2-RA and no-induction approaches declined.
Characteristics of the final cohort are summarized in the Supplemental Table 1. Approximately 80% of the recipients across all induction categories had at least one high-risk factor.
Recipients undergoing lymphocyte depletion were also more frequent recipients of kidneys
from ECD or DCD donors with correspondingly higher KDPI percentiles, as well as longer
CIT and more DGF. Despite this increased risk, lymphocyte depletion was associated with
lower rates of acute rejection in the first post-transplant year. At three years, overall allograft survival was better in antibody induction groups compared to no-induction category
(78.7% in no-induction, 80.2% in alemtuzumab, 81.8% in r-ATG, and 81.5% in IL-2 RA,
p=0.02). A multivariable Cox regression analysis was performed to evaluate risk factors for
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overall graft failure, shown in Supplemental Table S2. R-ATG was associated with overall
graft survival compared to no induction, and there was steady improvement in graft survival
over the study period.

4.3.2. Cumulative cost, effect and ICER
In the undiscounted analysis, the cumulative (non-parametric bootstrap) means for C and
E within three-years of transplantation based on the risk groups and induction categories
in DDRT recipients with Medicare primary coverage is shown in Table 1. In both low and
high-risk groups, treatment with no-induction was the least effective and the most expensive
compared with other induction categories. Alemtuzumab in the low-risk group and IL2RA in the high-risk group had the lowest mean C. In both risk groups, r-ATG was the
most effective induction treatment category. Among the high-risk subcategories, in general,
IL2-RA was the least expensive (except in AA patients), while r-ATG appeared to be the
most effective therapy (except in AA race and CIT > 24-hour subcategory). After applying
absolute and extended dominance, I calculated the median ICERs in the low-risk group and
among high-risk sub-categories as shown in Table 2. Note that my choice of reporting means
for expected costs and expected effects in Table 1 is consistent with the non-parametric
bootstrap methods. For the ICER values in Table 2, however, I reported the medians
because simultaneously changing costs (numerator of ICERs) and effects (denominator of
ICERs) in the bootstrapped samples creates doubly skewed distribution of ICER values.
The bootstrapped ICER for r-ATG compared to alemtuzumab was $32,511 per additional
graft years of graft survival saved in the low-risk group. For the high-risk group and its
subcategories the bootstrapped ICER was very sensitive to the graft survival; overall r-ATG
was still cost-effective, but for higher willingness to pay threshold except AA race and CIT
> 24 hours subcategories where alemtuzumab was more cost-effective induction of choice.

85

4.3.3. Sensitivity analysis
The ICERs for different willingness-to-pay threshold values ($100,000 and $150,000) were
performed Figure 4.2. In the low-risk group, r-ATG was the most cost-effective induction
therapy for both thresholds. For the subcategories of high-risk group, depletional antibodies
(r-ATG and alemtuzumab) remained the most cost-effective treatment for all risk profiles
and both thresholds, except in recipients with KDPI > 50% and older patients (age > 60)
where IL2-RA was more cost-effective for $100K threshold. The acceptability curves for
r-ATG in both risk groups are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. r-ATG continued to be costeffective in at least 80% of cases at 50, 000(50K) willingness to pay threshold in both risk
groups except in patients older than 60 years.
I also calculated the ICERs using 3% discount rate applied to both the health and cost
outcomes, shown in Supplemental Table S3. These analyses produced no important changes
in the results for the high-risk group. In the low risk group, I could not provide an ICER value
because the incremental effect (difference in health outcomesyears of graft survival between
r-ATG and alemtuzumab) became zero. Overall alemtuzumab appears to be cost-effective
strategy (lower cost and same effect).

4.4. Discussion
Over eighty percent of DDRT recipients in the U.S. receive antibody-based induction
therapy; my analysis indicates, on the whole, this is a cost-effective approach to immunosuppression. Specifically, based on my undiscounted analysis, 1) no-induction was the least
effective and most costly approach in both low and high-risk recipients; 2) r-ATG was the
most cost-effective strategy for all willingness-to-pay thresholds (with an ICER of $32,511
per additional year of graft survival compared to alemtuzumab, cost-effective at the $50K
threshold in approximately 80% of the recipients) in the low-risk group; 3) for the high-risk
group and its subcategories, the bootstrapped ICER was very sensitive to the graft survival;
overall, depletional antibodies were more cost-effective, but mainly for higher willingness to
pay threshold. Though r-ATG induction increased costs significantly, it was the most cost86

Figure 4.2. Summary of the strategies of choice based on willingness-to-pay in low or high-risk
recipients and individual high-risk subcategories (The ICER for African American category
is not included in the figure because alemtuzumab had the least expected cost and highest
effect, as indicated in Table 4.1, the most cost-effective induction of choice) based on the
undiscounted analysis.

effective induction at higher thresholds, except in AA race and recipients with CIT > 24
hours (alemtuzumab was the induction of choice at any thresholds for this subcategory).
The discounted analysis largely confirmed these findings except in the low-risk group where
alemtuzumab appeared to be more cost-effective (lower cost and same effect compared to
r-ATG category), a less robust conclusion reflective perhaps of a much smaller sample size
and wider variation in effect size in the alemtuzumab-treated low risk group.
There is no question that induction therapy (using IL2-RA, r-ATG, or alemtuzumab) increases initial cost during renal transplant hospitalization; my data indicate this is more than
offset by other benefits, such as decreasing short-term rejection rates and intermediate-term
graft survival in both low and high-risk recipients. Specifically, r-ATG appears to achieve
excellent CEAC (in higher than 80% of the recipients) in both risk groups (except patients
older than 60 years) even at $50,000 willingness to pay threshold (considered acceptable as
a value parameter in the U.S.). For patients older than 60 years, based on less steep r-ATG
CEAC Figure 4.4 and the ICERs for $100,000 willingness to pay threshold (Table 2), IL2-RA
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Figure 4.3. Acceptability curves for rATG induction in low and high-risk recipients.

Figure 4.4. Acceptability curves for r-ATG induction in high-risk subgcategories recipients.

might be more cost effective compared to r-ATG. Similarly, for AA race and patients with
CIT > 24 hours, alemtuzumab should be a preferable induction of choice.
The literature regarding the impact of cost on choice of appropriate induction agent is
limited and conflicting [48, 52, 62, 63, 103]. Morton et al. [48], using a Markov model based
on health outcomes from a published meta-analysis (mainly maintained on cyclosporine,
mycophenolate mofetile, and prednisone immunosuppression) [95, 96] and actual resource
costs from Australian Transplant Hospitals, reported that IL2-RA improved survival 1.4
quality adjusted life years (QALY) and saved AU$79,302 (Australian dollar) per patient over
a twenty year period compared to no-induction. IL2-RA was also cost-effective compared
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to polyclonal antibodies (using rabbit anti-thymocyte globulin and horse anti-lymphocyte
globulin) with the ICER of AU$14,803 per QALY saved. In a multicenter randomized trial
(N=135, with 60% of subjects undergoing DDRT), Polsky et al. compared basiliximab (IL2RA) and anti-thymocyte globulin (ATG) in cost and quality-adjusted survival [62]. Cost
saving with Basiliximab was $8,872, while quality-adjusted survival was same for both groups
at one-year. As part of a broader meta-analysis of newer immunosuppressants, a British
group found consistent reduction in acute rejection with improved one-year graft survival
when IL2-RA was compared to no-induction [103]. The Scottish Medicines Consortium
recommended against r-ATG as an induction therapy in renal transplantation in 2008 due
to lack of graft survival benefit and increased adverse effects compared to IL2-RA [77]. In
a single center retrospective study reported from the UK (N=45), Popat et al. studied
cost and outcomes of IL2-RA vs. r-ATG induction in recipients of donation after cardiac
death (DCD) renal transplantation [63]. Rabbit ATG was associated with less delayed graft
function, rejection, and rehospitalization; though graft and patient survival were similar,
r-ATG was associated with significant overall savings in cost.
In the current study, the large sample size and robust financial and health outcomes
data allow meaningful evaluation of even small differences. It addresses contemporary immunosuppression and reflects current practices in the U.S., including the impact of various
induction approaches in high-risk subgroups. Because my analysis utilizes national data
sources (combined Medicare claims and the UNOS registry) and incorporates the perspective of Medicare (actual payments), primary payer for at least first three years of renal
transplantation, it should be generalizable in this country. Within Medicare, bundled payment (Diagnosis-Related Group 302) for the initial kidney transplant hospitalization is not
adjusted for patient-specific comorbidities or resource utilization of a transplant center (such
as selection of induction agent, diagnostic testing, intensive care observation, length of stay
etc.). Consequently, differences in cost among induction categories most likely reflect subsequent hospitalizations and complication-related resource utilization. Furthermore, Medicare
perspective does not include societal costs (indirect costs, such as time and opportunity
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costs, and community preferences) [24]. Approximately 30% of recipients with a functioning
graft lose Medicare coverage three-years after renal transplantation, with no obvious source
of subsequent payment for maintenance immunosuppression, a factor that may indirectly
increase graft loss beyond three years (5). Though these issues may limit determination
of the overall costs of transplantation to the Medicare program, economic analyses from a
Medicare perspective have been widely accepted due to sample size, quality of data, predominance of payer role, and its effect on related governmental policy decisions (access to
transplant centers, kidney allocation, and long term immunosuppressive coverage).
The study has several limitations. Though it is the first to include analysis of costs
related to alemtuzumab, those data were accumulated at a time when, though off-label, the
drug was approved for use only in chronic lymphocytic leukemia, at a significantly lower
price than current FDA-approved marketing for multiple sclerosis, (see Supplement for the
cost of induction agents) [3, 5, 32]. The time frame of the study may reduce its ability to
detect long-term impact of induction, both adverse effects (such as malignancy) and potential
beneficial effects on long-term survival, which could either increase or reduce costs [33]. Total
exposure to r-ATG and alemtuzumab was not reported in the UNOS registry. Transplant
centers have increasingly been utilizing lower doses of r-ATG for induction purposes that may
change adverse event profile [6, 33, 102]. It should be emphasized that Medicare aggregate
data do not permit for fine cost analysis, such as readmission, complications, follow-up visits,
malignancy to better define incidence and mechanisms of short and long-term complications
related to use of induction agents. I also acknowledge that my choice of outcome variable as
graft survival leads to an ICER description (additional cost per year of graft survival) that
may be difficult to interpret as compared with the conventional use of cost per life years or
quality-adjusted life years. However, my choice is consistent with the primary objectives of
immunosuppression after transplantation. Finally, my analysis primarily relies on estimates
derived from 2000-2008 cohorts. Clinical use of induction agents in renal transplantation
may be different in 2016, at least partly as a consequence of implementation of a new kidney
allocation system in 2014, risk-averse behavior of transplant centers under new regulations
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(the CMS and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients report card system), and
economic disincentives for using marginal organs. However, as newer data mature, the
techniques utilized in my analysis can be applied to characterize the impact of alterations in
practice and related ICER trends.

4.5. Conclusions
After extensive analysis of Medicare data, with the limitations noted above, antibodybased induction appears to offer substantial advantages in both cost and outcome within
three-years of transplantation compared to no induction. Overall, for most but not all
recipients, depletional induction (preferably r-ATG) appears to offer the most beneficial
balance between cost and effect.
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Induction Type

Cumulative Cost
Observed Cost
Cost (USD*), 95%
(USD*)
Confidence Interval

Alemtuzumab
No-induction
IL2-RA
r-ATG

$131,885
$139,900
$141,762
$142,771

IL2-RA

$165,217

LOW RISK RECIPIENT
121,723-142,193
133,678-146,941
134,260-151,206
136,480-149,297
HIGH-RISK RECIPIENT
161,738-168,630

r-ATG
Alemtuzumab
No-induction
High-risk
subcategories

$166,435
$171,022
$189,333

166,002-172,338
164,339-177,856
185,142-193,398

IL2-RA
r-ATG
Alemtuzumab
No-induction

$165,366
$169,651
$173,531
$185,551

Alemtuzumab
IL2-RA
r-ATG
No-induction

$161,850
$168,609
$169,356
$198,683

IL2-RA
r-ATG
Alemtuzumab
No-induction

$177,122
$181,119
$183,90
$206,932

IL2-RA
Alemtuzumab
r-ATG
No-induction

$164,512
$169,949
$173,794
$211,958

IL2-RA
r-ATG
Alemtuzumab
No-induction

$172,433
$179,481
$185,350
$204,865

Cumulative Effect
Observed Effect
Effect (months),
(months)
95%
Confidence
Interval
33.14
31.95
32.75
33.19

31.03-34.19
31.31-32.57
32.22-33.24
32.68-33.66

30.79

30.13-31.49

31.10
30.88
29.56

30.85-31.34
30.27-31.47
29.21-29.92

PRA>20%
157,126-174,053
30.97
163,792-176,014
31.58
158,459-189,505
31.02
177,135-194,969
29.25
African American
152,408-171,999
31.42
161,458-175,827
30.46
165,347-173,123
31.22
192,062-205,993
29.37
KDPI>50%
172,105-182,262
29.87
176,286-185,313
30.18
174,605-192,251
29.92
200,836-213,083
28.69
CIT> 24 hours
158,283-171,369
30.91
159,332-181,889
31.37
168,812-179,883
31.06
203,043-221,638
28.93
Age> 60 years-old
167,803-177,096
30.32
174,732-184,241
30.43
174,202-196,315
29.55
198,057-211,631
28.74

30.26-31.70
31.12-32.05
29.68-32.27
28.42.25-30.1
30.52-32.29
29.91-31.00
30.82-31.60
28.81-29.90
29.40-30.33
29.82-30.53
29.10-30.72
28.21-29.18
30.32-31.42
30.44-32.28
30.57-31.57
28.26-29.53
29.89-30.77
30.02-30.84
28.47 -30.50
28,18-29.34

Table 4.1. Cumulative mean cost and effect within three-years of transplantation based on
the induction category in DDKT recipients with Medicare primary coverage.
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Strategy

Cost
USD*

(C),

Incremental
Cost, USD*

Alemtuzumab
r-ATG

138,414
141,340

2,926

IL2-RA
r-ATG
High-risk
subcategories

164,750
167,357

2,607

IL2-RA
r-ATG

167,270
171,485

4215

IL2-RA
r-ATG

176,284
179,843

3,559

IL2-RA
Alemtuzumab

165,875
170,845

4,970

IL2-RA
r-ATG

171,418
179,452

8,034

Effect
years

(E),

LOW-RISK
2.69
2.78
HIGH-RISK
2.55
2.57

Incremental
Effect, years

C/E

ICER

0.09

51,455
50,841

32,511

0.02

64,607
65,119

130,350

65,339
65,203

60,214

71,370
71,937

118,633

66,350
64,227

31,062

68,567
70,098

133,900

PRA>20%
2.56
2.63
0.07
KDPI> 50%
2.47
2.50
0.03
CIT>24 hours
2.50
2.66
0.16
Age> 60 years-old
2.50
2.56
0.06
African American**
2.62
2.60
0.02

Alemtuzumab 161,850
61,775
r-ATG
169,356
7,506
65,137
*The cost adjusted to 2013 U.S. dollar value.
**The ICER is not included because alemtuzumab is marginally dominant strategy for African American category in
the high-risk group.

Table 4.2. Cost effectiveness analysis based on induction regimens for individual low and
high-risk DDKT recipients.

93

Strategy

Cost
2013
value

(C),
USD

Incremental
Cost,
2013
USD value

Alemtuzumab
r-ATG

125,316
136,185

IL2-RA
r-ATG
High-risk
subcategories

154,088
159,894

IL2-RA
r-ATG

154,268
157,567

3,299

IL2-RA
r-ATG

162,431
167,160

4,729

IL2-RA
Alemtuzumab

153,999
158,686

4,687

IL2-RA
r-ATG

156,990
163,100

6,110

Alemtuzumab
r-ATG

152,918
161,772

8,854

10,869

5,806

Effect
years

(E),

LOW-RISK*
2.64
2.64
HIGH-RISK
2.43
2.48

PRA>20%
2.43
2.49
KDPI> 50%
2.38
2.42
CIT>24 hours
2.46
2.56
Age> 60 years-old
2.41
2.47
African American*
2.51
2.49

Incremental
Effect, years

C/E

ICER

0.00

47.468
51,585

0.05

63,410
64,473

116,120

0.06

63,484
63,279

54,983

0.04

68,243
69,074

118,225

0.10

62,601
61,986

46,870

0.06

65,141
66,032

101,833

0.02

60,924
64,968

*The ICER is not included. The ICER is not defined for the low risk group because the incremental
health effects among alemtuzumab and r-ATG is zero (division by zero). In the African American
category, alemtuzumab is marginally dominant strategy.

Table 4.3. Inflation adjusted and outcomes discounted cost-effectiveness analysis based on
induction regimens for low and high-risk recipients.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

5.1. Concluding remarks
This dissertation attempts to clarify the effect of kidney transplant center’s performance
assessment and different kidney allocation schemes on donor kidney and patient acceptance
decisions. Moreover I study the association between kidney transplant outcomes and changes
in the kidney allocation scheme. I identify essential parameters that require to be considered
in designing an optimal citation policy applied to underperforming transplant centers and
whether they need to be adjusted upon kidney allocation modification. I propose a simulation
model with two applications, one provides an optimal deceased donor kidney acceptance
guidance for the decision makers, whereas the other one concentrates on the social welfare
aspect of kidney transplantation. The work is completed with analyzing the cost-effectiveness
of antibody-based induction therapy in deceased donor kidney transplantation in the United
States.
In Chapter 2, I develop and analyze a theoretical model to examine the role of performance assessment and its subsequent citation policy for underperforming centers on kidney
transplantation decisions. The first contribution is to propose a stochastic model that determines the socially optimum kidney transplant decision based on the inherent trade off
between the waiting time and the kidney quality that optimizes the social welfare. I also
model the optimal decision rule for a completely self-interested provider and then modify
the model to the case that provider’s tendency of benevolence increases. I find the optimal
citation policy that minimizes the social loss which is the difference between providers utility
and welfares utility. Furthermore, I model the candidate’s acceptance decision to transplant
center’s waitlist with the objective function of minimizing the waiting list mortality rate.
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The model identifies candidates minimum health threshold at the time of evaluation as a
guideline for enlisting the candidate, if her health score exceeds this threshold. I incorporate
provider’s risk preference in the patient acceptance decision. I also show how the transplant
decisions are influenced by changes made to the KAS and propose how the citation policy
used by the regulator has to be modified accordingly. The model investigates how a citation
policy can affect kidney transplant program’s decision making on accepting donor kidneys
and candidates to program’s waitlist. In addition, the model allows for exercising different
risk preferences (neutral, risk averse and risk seeking) adopted by the decision makers. For
the numerical illustration and parameter estimation, I use combined clinical data from the
national waiting list data included in the UNOS annual reports and the Scientific Registry
of Transplant Recipient (SRTR).
The empirical study provides several important insights regarding an effective and efficient kidney transplant decision and an outcome oversight. First, observations from the
data indicate that candidate blood type and region influence their wait time notably. However, I notice that the qualities of accepted kidneys are almost the same among recipients
with different blood types in different regions. This could be an indication that the decision
makers do not take the donor kidney supply into account. The importance of candidates’
individual offer rates needs to be of concern to the decision makers for making donor kidney
acceptance/rejection decisions. The socially optimal kidney acceptance decision derived by
using the developed model and real data varies notably from one region to another given
its kidney supply. According to the analysis, Region 3 with ks∗ = 0.69 has the highest average utility of 12.87 years, whereas Region 9 shows the average utility of 10.4 as a result of
ks∗ = 0.53
The empirical study also reveals that the current citation policy introduced as CoP in
2007 has been effective for 42% of the recipients in providing socially optimal transplantation
decisions. The remaining 58% of the recipients are impacted by receiving sub-optimal kidneys; however, in general, the social loss and deficiency have decreased across all 11 regions.
We also observe an increase in the degree of benevolence among the 11 regions. Overall,
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based on the analysis, after the introduction of CoP in 2007 a total 34, 789 life years have
been saved across all recipients who received donor kidney transplantation.
The analysis indicates that the introduction of the new KAS in 2014 resulted in a reduction of the social loss by 1,292 life years per year over the entire population and this
supports the still questioned notion that the introduction was a success. As a result of KAS,
the access of high-EPTS patients to good quality kidneys is now reduced. This can change
the post-transplant outcomes of this group of patients and subsequently the performance
of transplant centers that perform their surgeries. To satisfy fairness and equity conditions
and restrict the risk of discrimination of accessing to the care, it might be necessary for the
regulators to modify or risk-adjust the citation policy accordingly.
In Chapter 3, the proposed simulation model considers the effect of several important
factors for kidney allocation and transplantation. Factors such as the deterioration of patient
health and kidney quality over time, the correlation between patient’s health and acceptance
decision, and the probability of kidney acceptance are included in the model. As a result
of the first application, the patient may benefit from selecting more than one region to be
waitlisted and so reduces her wait time. The region-selection model relies on two facts: 1)
The achievable optimal expected utility in any region, and 2) patient’s set of constraints
on budget, distance and performance. The attention of the second application is on a
macro-level aspect of transplantation, namely the contribution of information sharing on
the social welfare and discard rates. I find that by providing up-to-date information to
OPTN, we can accelerate the process of matching a patient to an available donor organ
and potentially reduce the waitlist mortality rate. The information also assists in improving
kidney utilization and transplant rates. For the numerical analysis I use data obtained from
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) and the Scientific Registry
of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). Modern technology using ubiquitous mobile devices could
facilitate better procurement of up-to-date information by the OPTN and thus has the
potential for significantly enhancing the efficiency of organ allocation. We show that by
efficiently searching for matching patients the transplant and waitlist mortality rates can
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improve up to 42% and 14%, respectively.
Transplantation is costly with wide discrepancy in utilization and a limited base of evidence, particularly in regard to cost-effectiveness. In Chapter 4 I link the United States
Renal Data System dataset to the Medicare claims to estimate the cumulative costs, graft
survival, and incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER cost per additional year of graft
survival) within 3 years of transplantation in 19,450 deceased donor kidney transplantation
recipients with Medicare as the primary payer from 2000 to 2008. The study cohort is
classified into high-risk and low-risk classes. By estimating the expected ICER among four
induction categories: no-induction, alemtuzumab, rabbit anti-thymocyte globulin (rATG),
and interleukin-2 receptor-antagonist our analysis indicates that no-induction is the leasteffective and most-costly option in both risk groups. Depletional antibodies (r-ATG and
alemtuzumab) are more cost-effective across all willingness-to-pay thresholds in the low-risk
group. For the high-risk group and its subcategories, the ICER is very sensitive to the kidney survival. Depletional antibodies are more cost-effective, for higher willingness to pay
thresholds (US $100, 000 and US $150, 000). Results show also that only r-ATG is associated with the kidney survival benefit. The extensive analysis of Medicare data suggests that
antibody-based induction appears to offer substantial advantages in both cost and outcome
three-years post-transplant compared to no induction.

5.2. Future study
Organ transplantation is a complex process with many participating parties and there
is much room for further investigation. One major research thrust needs to address the
effects of the interaction between actors. This includes sharing information between actors
by observing other actor’s decisions and competition. For example, the fact that a waitlisted
patient at any center has received an organ offer shows that all the previous patients turned
that organ down. This information could bias the patient’s expectation of the quality of the
organ. In a system where the decision makers can observe other agents’ decisions, gaming
the system is not unlikely. Investigating the role of decision dependency among agents (pa98

tients and transplant centers) by disclosing individual information on organ acceptance and
rejection criteria might provide useful insights to study the agents’ behaviors and responses
which can potentially be used to improve the overall system. Competition between patients
for organs and between centers for patients and organs also influences decisions, and the
impact of these forces on welfare and the effectiveness of regulation needs to be throughly
investigated.
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Appendix A
Definition of variables and parameters

Table A.1. Definition of rates
µ

Kidney arrival rate

µo

Kidney offer rate

µa

Kidney acceptance rate

µla

Kidney acceptance rate post KAS - low risk

µha

Kidney acceptance rate post KAS - high risk

Table A.2. Definition of kidney quality
q

Kidney quality ∈ [0, 1]

kc∗

Candidate’s optimal kidney quality threshold

kp∗

Provider’s optimal kidney quality threshold

ks∗
kl∗
kh∗

Social planer’s optimal kidney quality threshold
Low-risk candidate’s optimal kidney quality threshold post KAS
High-risk candidate’s optimal kidney quality threshold post KAS

Table A.3. Definition of utility and expected utility functions
U c (h, q, k)

Candidate’s post-transplant utility

c

Candidate’s expected post-transplant utility, social welfare utility

p

E(U )

Provider’s expected post-transplant utility

E(Ulc )

Low-risk candidates’s expected post-transplant utility post-KAS

E(Uhc )

High-risk candidates’s expected post-transplant utility post-KAS

E(U )
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Table A.4. Definition of survival and hazard functions
S(kp , h, t)

One-year post-transplant survival

F (kP , h, t)

One-year post-transplant failure

S w (h0 , t)

Patient survival until transplant

F w (h0 , t)

Patient failure before transplant

λ(kp , h)

Hazard function post-transplant period

λh
λw (h0 , t)

Post-transplant hazard rate
Hazard function pre-transplant period

Table A.5. Other definitions
αc

Candidate’s risk preference ∈ [0, 1]

αp

Provider’s risk preference ∈ [0, 1]

δ

Provider’s degree of benevolence

wt

Maximum wait time until receiving an acceptable offer

B

Provider’s benefit from tx

B

0

Providers’s benefit from enlisting candidate

C0

Cost of losing candidates on the waitlist

Cp

Providers’s cost of being flagged

fp

Providers’s probability of being flagged

h

Candidate’s life score when she joins the queue top part

h0

Candidate’s life score when she joins provider’s waitlist

N

Number of active candidates

Nl , Nh

Number of active low- and high-risk candidates
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Appendix B
Proofs

B.1. Proof of Proposition (2)
Substituting (2.2)-(2.4) into (3.1) results in:

U c (h, q, k) = mh q 1 −

!

1
ln( 1−α
)
c

µo h(1 − k)

By taking the expected value given Q ∼ U (0, 1), we have:
mh (1 + k)
E(U c ) =
2

1−

1
)
ln( 1−α
c

!

µo h(1 − k)

Then, taking the first order derivative results in:
∂E(U c )
mh
=
∂k
2

1−

!

1
)
2ln( 1−α
c

µo h(1 − k)2

Setting the above equation to zero results (2.13). The second derivative is obtained as:
∂ 2 E(U c )
mh
=
∂k 2
2

−

1
ln( 1−α
)
c

µo h(1 − k)2

which is always negative, so kc∗ in (2.8) is a maximum point.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 2.1
By substituting αc = 1 −

1
e

in B.1, ks∗ can be obtained.

B.3. Proof of (2.17)-(2.19)
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!

The numerator of λ(t) in (2.17) can be written as:

P (T ≤ t + dt | T ≥ t) =

P (t ≤ T ≤ t + dt) ∼ g(t) dt
=
P (T ≥ t)
S(t)

Substituting in (2.15) results in:
λ(t) =

g(t)
S(t)

which is the definition of hazard function. since −g(t) is a derivative of S(t), wecan rewrite
λ(t) as:
λ(t) = −

d
ln(S(t))
dt

Integrating from 0 to t and applying the boundary condition S(0) = 1 (since the event can
not have occurred within a zero duration) results in:

 Z t
λ(x)dx
S(t) = exp −
0

The above integral is called the cumulative hazard (or cumulative risk ) which can be thought
of as the sum of risk values from time 0 to t. Let’s suppose in our model, the survival
distribution is obtained by assuming a constant risk over the first year post-transplant and
the hazard function is defined as
λ(q, h) = λ0h (1 − E[Q|Q ≥ kp ])
with
R1
k

E[Q|Q ≥ kp ] = R p1
kp

qf (q)dq
f (q)dq

The hazard function for all q ≥ kp and t ≤ 1 is:
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=

1 + kp
.
2

λ(q, h) = λ0h (1 − E[Q|Q ≥ kp ]) =

λ0h
(1 − kp ) = λh (1 − kp )
2

A constant hazard is equivalent to exponentially distributed lifetime that has memoryless
property and the corresponding survival and failure functions for aforementioned constant
hazard function are respectively obtained as:

S(kp |t = 1) = exp(−λh (1 − kp ))
F (kp |t = 1) =1 − exp(−λh (1 − kp ))

B.4. Proof of Proposition (5)
From (2.22) we get exp(−λh (1 − kp )) ≥ 1 −
results in −λh (1 − kp ) ≥ ln(1 −

B
)
C p fp

B
.
C p fp

Taking the logarithm from both sides

or kp|CP ≥ 1 +

1
λh

ln(1 −

B
).
Cp fp

Thus, the optimal

kidney quality threshold under the citation policy consideration given B < Cp fp is obtained
as (2.23).

B.5. Proof of Proposition (6)
Substituting (2.13) and (2.23) into (2.24) results in:
r
1−

2
1
B
=1+
ln(1 −
)
µo h
λh
Cp fp

By simple math calculation and rearrangement we get:
r
−λh

B
2
= ln(1 −
)
µo h
Cp fp
r

exp(−λh
Cp∗ fp∗ =

2
B
)=1−
µo h
Cp fp
B

exp(−λh
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q

2
)
µo h

B.6. Proof of Corollary (7)
By placing (2.26) and (2.27) in (2.28) we have:




0

0

h − w +
B 

h0
0

1
ln 1−α

p
µo (1−ks∗ )

0 0




h − w0 +



0



 ≥ C 0 1 −



0

0

0

B h ≥ (B + c ) w +

1
ln 1−α

p
µo (1−ks∗ )

h0

1
ln 1−α
p






!

µo (1 − ks∗ )

0

which results in h ∗ in (2.29).

B.7. Proof of Proposition (8)
Similar to proof of (2.13), by substituting (2.31) and (2.32) in (2.33) and take a derivative
with respect to kl equation (2.34) can be obtained.
B.8. Proof of Corollary (2)
By substituting π = 0.8 in the equation (2.34) and subtract equation (2.13) from it one
can see 1.8 −

1.61
µo h

−1+

1.41
µo h

is always positive as long as µo h > 0.06. This requirement

is always met by low-risk candidate, meaning that the they increase their kidney quality
threshold post-KAS.

B.9. Proof of Proposition (9)
similar to proof of (2.34) by using the expected wait time of wh (k) =

1
.
µh
o

B.10. Proof of Proposition (10)
By substituting (2.38) and µo =

µπ
,
N

post KAS offer rate for high risk candidate, in (2.29)

we have:


c0
1+ 0
w0 +
B
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1
ln 1−α
p
µo π
(1
N

− kh∗ )

!

0

∗
The result of subtracting this equation from (2.29) is negative. Therefore hkas
is greater
0

than h ∗ .
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